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How selsh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses
are likewise small, it satises all social requirements for a res-
idence. But let there arise next to a little house a palace, and
the little house shrinks into a hut. [...] and however high it may
shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighboring palace
rises in equal or even greater measure, the occupant of the rel-
atively little house will always nd himself more uncomfortable,
more dissatised, more cramped within his four walls.
Karl Marx, Wage-Labor and Capital
1 Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
The pioneer economist Francis Y. Edgeworth (1881) states in his seminal
article Mathematical Psychics that \the rst principle of economics is that
every agent is actuated only by self-interest". For the most part of the 20th
century, virtually all economic models understood self-interest exclusively as
concern for own material payo. This had not always been the case, however,
as most early economists had in fact a much broader view on the matter.
Self-interest was, quite generally, the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of
pain (Bentham 1789). Utility, therefore, was a real psychological substance
and consequently, understanding the determinants of hedonic sensations and
nding a way to reliably measure them was central to early economics. It
was only about one hundred years ago that the concept of self-interest was
narrowed down substantially.
At the end of the 19th century, economics attempted to associate itself
more with the natural sciences, which had made signicant advancements
by focusing attention on mathematical analysis of objective facts instead
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of searching for the metaphysical essence of matter as scholars had done
previously. Jevons (1871), Edgeworth (1881), and others had already math-
ematically formalized the idea of hedonic utility as the force behind behav-
ior by re-applying concepts from physics to economic problems, but some
economists like Pareto argued that economics also had to rid itself of its
metaphysical and psychological baggage and pay attention only to observed
behavior (Pareto 1971). In anticipation of what later became known as the
revealed preference principle, Pareto argued that whatever goes on under
the surface must inevitably reveal itself through behavior (Bruni and Sug-
den 2007). As a result, the main attention of economic research increasingly
turned away from experienced sensations toward observed choices, eventually
leading to an universal \as-if" approach concerned solely with the accuracy of
its models' predictions, but uninterested in the correctness of the underlying
assumptions (Friedman 1953).
This development alone would not have made material self-interest the
only commonly accepted motivation for economic behavior, but Pareto and
others took it a step further. To distance economics from other social sci-
ences, they restricted economic theory to the analysis of logical actions, i.e.,
instrumental actions resulting from objectively true premises through deduc-
tion, pitted against the standard of rational choice. As such, the science of
economics had to be primarily unconcerned with the application of its prin-
ciples in the real world (Pareto 1971). The aspiration was not to explain
human behavior universally, but only a limited range of behavior conforming
to the theory. Pareto therefore restricted the analysis to repeated actions,
ensuring that theoretically, learning would eventually eliminate all logical
mistakes. When later generations dropped this restriction and applied the
theory to all kinds of non-repeated actions, they nevertheless kept dismissing
violations of the rational model as errors that would eventually vanish with
repetition (Binmore and Samuelson 1999).
Still, even the focus on (repeated) rational choice does not necessarily
entail that the only source of motivation has to be own material payo.
Unlike Mill (1844), who wanted to restrict people's motivation in political
economy to the pursuit of wealth, Pareto explicitly left the door open for
altruism or other forms of other-regarding preferences, which in principle
are compatible with his approach (Pareto 1971). In the end, there were
probably several reasons why pure material self-interest eventually prevailed.
For one thing, the idea that human nature is inherently selsh already had
a long philosophical history, with Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, and Rousseau
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providing major contributions to this school of thought.
Critics from outside of economics seem to have played a crucial role, too.
In the early 20th century, psychologists attacked the hedonic approach as
too restrictive, therefore unrealistic and also unreliable (McDougall 1910).
This led many economists to abandon references to hedonistic sensations
entirely (Lewin 1996), paving the way for material self-interest to take over.
And nally, a rather mundane reason is that the abstractness of the selsh
model simply works well with the mathematical approach of rational choice
theory, making material self-interest the most convenient proxy for other
possible motives (Mullainathan and Thaler 2001). So convenient in fact that
it gradually lost its proxy designation and became a key characteristic of the
homo oeconomicus, the protagonist of rational behavior.1
1.2 The Rise of Social Preferences
Even though selshness was never an integral part of rationality (Sen 1977),
it was the last property of the homo oeconomicus to come under serious re.
Early on, Simon (1955) challenged the perfect information processing capa-
bility while Kahneman, Tversky, and associates attacked perfect rationality
on several fronts (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky
1979). But although the psychologist Adams (1963) had long ago developed
equity theory { a psychological model assuming that workers dislike being
compensated unequally { other-regarding preferences mostly stayed under
the radar even as behavioral economics slowly became institutionalized as a
eld during the early 1980s. That nally started to change { albeit slowly
{ when Guth et al. (1982) published their results of the ultimatum game
experiment.
The ultimatum game is a two-player-game where the rst player proposes
an allocation of a pie and the second player either accepts or rejects the
proposal. If he accepts, the proposal is paid out, but if he rejects, both players
receive nothing. There are many Nash-equilibria in this game, but the only
sub-game perfect equilibrium has the second player accept any positive oer.
Anticipating this, the rst player chooses the allocation in which the second
player receives the lowest possible positive outcome. In reality, however,
proposals by the rst player generally are much higher { the modal oer is
1For a more detailed discussion of the paradigm shift in economics, see Lewin (1996)
and Bruni and Sugden (2007), who give quite divergent accounts of the era.
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often 50% of the pie { and the second player often rejects positive oers when
receiving less than the proposer.
The ultimatum game experiment was replicated and modied many times
over the next few years (reviews in Thaler 1988; Guth 1995), but the general
results persisted. However, disagreement over how to interpret the ndings
soon arose. While some regarded them as prove for fairness concerns, oth-
ers insisted that they were erroneous anomalies (Binmore et al. 1985; Gale
et al. 1995). However, control experiments eventually showed that neither
low stakes (Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999), missing learning oppor-
tunities (Slonim and Roth 1998), anonymity (Bolton and Zwick 1995), nor
strategic uncertainty (Forsythe et al. 1994) could completely account for the
divergence from the game theoretic equilibrium. In the last study, Forsythe
et al. developed a modication of the ultimatum game called dictator game,
which made it obvious that many people did in fact care about the outcome
of the other player.
Like the ultimatum game, the dictator game is a two-player-game, al-
though the second player is only in a passive role. Again, the rst player
decides on the division of a pie, but unlike in the ultimatum game, the second
player has no say in the matter and the chosen allocation is immediately paid
out. The only individually rational decision for the rst player in the game
is of course to keep the whole pie. However, although the second player's
share of the pie is usually smaller on average than in ultimatum game oers,
many people { often the majority { do give a positive amount of up to 50%
of the pie.
The ultimatum game and dictator game studies ultimately spawned a
series of outcome-based models of social preferences that tried to reconcile
the results of the two games with utility maximization. The rst attempt
was probably made by Bolton (1991), who complemented monetary utility
with some \relative utility". The idea eventually evolved into the model of
inequity aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who presumed that peo-
ple suer inequity costs when their own payo diers from the equal share.
A related model was developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in which indi-
viduals compare their own payo with the payo of others and suer from
compassion or envy if they are better or worse o, respectively. Another
model with a dierent approach was later developed by Charness and Ra-
bin (2002). They assume that people are not motivated by some form of
inequity version, but instead by welfare concerns for total eciency and for
the individual with the lowest payo.
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A dierent line of social preferences developed around the so-called gift-
exchange game. The idea for the game goes back to Akerlof (1982, 1984),
who hypothesized that rms are paying workers salaries above the marked-
clearing wage and workers are repaying this \kind" behavior with higher
eort. Fehr et al. (1993) found support for this fair-wage-theory in a highly
stylized, yet very inuential experiment. In a one-sided auction, buyers made
price oers and upon acceptance, sellers determined the quality of the good.
The majority of oers were well above the market clearing level and sellers
on average responded to higher prices with higher quality. The experiment
is widely viewed as the rst clear evidence for the importance of reciprocal
behavior in economic interactions.
Rabin (1993) was the rst to translate the concept of reciprocity into a
mathematical model. Drawing on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos
et al. 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009), he postulated that individuals
form beliefs about the kindness of others (which are conrmed in equilib-
rium) and then prefer to reward those they perceive as kind and punish
those they perceive as unkind. The main idea of the model was rened and
extended several times, most notably by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). A slightly dierent approach was proposed
by Levine (1998), who assumed that the weight put on another person's pay-
o depends on an individual's inherent type as well as on (the belief about)
the type of the other person. However, Rabin's model and its successors were
more inuential and prompted a series of other experiments highlighting the
importance of intentionality in social interaction (e.g. Blount 1995; Falk et
al. 2003) as well as a re-evaluation of the ultimatum game results in the light
of reciprocity (e.g. Kagel et al. 1996; Bolton et al. 1998b).
Another front where the prevalence of selshness was challenged were
social dilemma games. Social dilemma games are characterized by the conict
of individually optimal behavior and socially optimal behavior. For example,
in the standard public goods game, each player receives an endowment which
he can either keep for himself or invest in the public good. The total amount
invested in the public good is multiplied with a factor greater than 1 (but
less than the number of players). The resulting amount is then distributed
evenly among all players. The socially ecient decision is to invest the whole
endowment into the public good, whereas the individually rational decision
is of course to keep the whole endowment. Any individual motivated only by
own material gain would therefore always choose the latter strategy.
Provisions to public goods have been analyzed experimentally since the
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1970s (Bohm 1972; Dawes et al. 1977; Marwell and Ames 1979). The re-
sults reject the assumption of purely self-regarding behavior by all players
in virtually all instances. In one-shot public goods game, the majority of
players usually makes signicant contributions to the public good, although
free-riders, i.e., players who do not contribute at all, of course also exist.
In repeated interactions, contributions typically decline gradually over time
(e.g. Kim and Walker 1984; Isaac et al. 1985) with a particularly steep drop in
the last round { the so called end-game-eect. Yet, contributions generally
do not vanish completely and even increase again after a surprise re-start
(Andreoni 1988), suggesting that contributions are not a behavioral error
vanishing with experience (see also e.g. Marwell and Ames 1980; Palfrey and
Prisbrey 1997).
Two modications of the standard public goods game have been partic-
ularly inuential. The rst one introduces a punishment mechanism which
allows players to pay some costs to decrease another player's payo after
contributions to the public good have been made (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and
Gachter 2000). Since punishment is costly, no rational player should ever
engage in it. However, the punishment mechanism is typically used by high
contributors against low contributors, which usually has a disciplining eect,
stabilizing players' contributions on a relatively high level in repeated public
goods game (although punishment by low contributors exists, too; see Her-
rmann et al. 2008). The second modication turns the public goods game
into a sequential game, allowing players to condition their own contribution
on the contributions of the other players. Fischbacher et al. (2001) found
that most players are conditional contributors, i.e., they increase their own
contribution as the contributions of other players go up. Both punishment
and conditional contribution are of course incompatible with material self-
interest, yet are very much in line with both models of inequity aversion and
models of reciprocity.
1.3 Recent and Future Developments
Over the last two decades, the experimental literature around the ultimatum
game, dictator game, gift-exchange game and public goods game has grown
tremendously, producing countless variants and modications of the four
games as well as completely new kind of decision-making situations that shall
remain unmentioned here because there are simply too many of them by now.
The assertion that most people do in fact care very much about how their own
11
wealth compares to that of others, about fairness of outcomes and procedures,
and about the intentions of others cannot be seriously questioned any more.
Of course, this does not rule out that competition or other (market) forces
may subdue or crowd out social preferences in certain situations, making
it look as if people were only concerned for their own material payo (e.g.
Smith 1962). Despite the extensive theoretical and empirical research, there
are still many aspects of social preferences that are not understood completely
(or at all). Some facets may very well not even be on our radar yet until
somebody points them out to the world, whereupon they will probably seem
quite obvious all of a sudden. All in all, it appears that the eld is in no
danger of becoming saturated any time soon.
Naturally, nobody knows what the next hot topic regarding social pref-
erences will be, but there have been a few recent experiments spurring new
discussions among researchers that might give us a clue of where the eld is
heading toward in the next years. For example, Dana and colleagues have
conducted experiments on other-regarding preferences involving information
asymmetries (Dana et al. 2006, 2007). Their subjects curtail altruistic be-
havior when their actions are not fully observable by the receivers, which
is dicult to explain with the current models. Meanwhile, Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) nd that individuals seem to try to live up to others'
expectations, apparently to avoid letting others down. However, the results
of Vanberg (2008) indicate that in fact individuals seem to care little about
others' disappointment, but instead are just inclined to keep promises they
made. These kind of ndings may seem rather marginal compared to equal-
ity and reciprocity concerns in general, however, properly interpreting such
results may very well be the key to a deeper understanding of the true nature
of other-regarding preferences.
Another topic that has recently arrived on the scene is social risk taking,
i.e., risk preferences in situations when both own and other persons' payos
are at stake. In an inter-cultural study, Bohnet et al. (2008) play stylized
trust games2 and do not nd much inuence of general social motivations like
inequality aversion or altruism on social risk taking. In their comment to this
article, Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) address this issue by comparing one-
person- and dictator-game-choice-problems by varying the second player's
payo for safe and risky options. Disadvantageous inequality in the safe
2The trust game is a variant of the gift-exchange game where the rst player \invests"
into the positive reciprocal response of the second player, see Blount 1995.
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option seems to increase risk taking, but inequality in the risky choice does
not. Furthermore, Bradler (2009) measures individuals' social preferences
under certainty, regular risk preferences and interpersonal risk preferences
separately, concluding that depending on the relative standings, many people
are willing to accept more risk or forgo own payo to increase others' payos.
Overall, at the current state of research, the question to what extend social
preferences under uncertainty are more than the straightforward combination
of principles of other-regarding behavior and risk preferences is still largely
unresolved.
Some researchers have also started to carry experiments on social pref-
erence from the laboratory into the real world. For example, Gneezy and
List (2006) conduct a real-life gift-exchange game by paying some student
workers more than initially advertised. As predicted by the theory, those
workers receiving the higher salary produce more output, although the eect
wears o after some hours and the net-prot of the gift is negative for the
employer in the experiment. In another study, Falk (2007) sends out letters
asking for donations to charity and attaches gifts of various value to them.
In line with reciprocity, the average donation increase with the value of the
gift. These two examples show that social preferences are not just artifacts
of escapist games, restricted to the obscurity of economic laboratories, but
that they do in fact not only exist in the real world, but are responsible for
sizable economic eects, too.
Another subeld of economics is receiving a lot of public attention re-
cently: Neuroeconomics aims to { quite literally { look inside people's heads
while making decisions. Using neuroimaging techniques like functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) or magnetoencephalography (MEG), neuroe-
conomists measure activity in distinct brain regions or trace the chronological
sequence of dierent neural events, respectively. Transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (TMS) can even be used to temporarily disrupt specic brain regions
to study functioning and interconnections of the regions in question.
Many neuroeconomic studies on social preferences focus on the brain's
reward system. Rilling et al. (2002, 2004) nd that subjects have stronger ac-
tivation in reward-related brain regions when cooperating with human coun-
terparts than with a computer. The rewards system is also activated when
making charitable donations (Moll et al. 2006; Harbaugh et al. 2007) and
receiving fair oers in the ultimatum game (Tabibnia et al. 2008). Further-
more, de Quervain et al. (2004) show that eective punishment of defectors
in a prisoner's dilemma leads to stronger neural responses than symbolic
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punishment. In the study by Fliessbach et al. (2007), two subjects simul-
taneously perform a task over many rounds, receiving varying prizes when
successful. Activation in reward-related brain areas generally is lower when
receiving a relatively low prize compared to the other subject and vice versa.
However, the reward system is of course not the only brain region related
to social preferences. Sanfey et al. (2003) demonstrate that both regions
concerned with emotions and with cognition are active when receiving unfair
ultimatum game oer. Furthermore, Koenigs and Tranel (2007) nd that
subjects with lesions in the prefrontol cortex { a region associated with con-
ict resolution { were more likely to reject unfair ultimatum game oers,
suggesting that the region is involved in moderating emotions with mate-
rial costs and benets. Moreover, not all activations are created equal. For
example, cooperators in simple trust-and-reciprocity games have more ac-
tivation in prefrontal regions when playing with human partners than with
computers, but non-cooperators show no dierence (McCabe et al. 2001).
Additionally, Singer et al. (2006) nd that empathic neural responses de-
pend on the perceived fairness of others.
Part of the appeal of neuroeconomics certainly stems from the intrigue
of the ever increasing technological possibilities and the general fascination
of the brain as such, but another part comes from its virtual promise to do
what economists have desired since the 19th century: to allow direct and
reliable measurement of an individual's utility. However, as alluring as this
promise most certainly is, restraint and caution are warranted. On the one
hand, equating neural activation with utility may be tempting, but it would
surely be shortsighted to ignore all other sources of happiness and motivation
except for momentary peaks in archaic regulatory systems. On the other
hand, neuroeconomics also faces substantial methodological criticism. For
example, Rubinstein (2006) argues that conclusions in neuroeconomic studies
are often drawn based on rather scant data, but use colorful graphics to create
the illusion of hard evidence. He also claims that most neuroeconomic studies
produce very little { if any { new economic knowledge, because records of
neural activation alone oer very little explanatory value (Rubinstein 2008).
Despite these reservations, neuroeconomics is not going away anytime soon.
Finally, as behavioral economics increasingly makes its way from the lab-
oratories into the real world, its protagonists will also more frequently have
to deal with ethical questions. While marketing has been applying psycho-
logical insights for decades { not necessarily to the benet of the consumers
(e.g. Slovic 2001) { behavioral economists have only recently started to use
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their knowledge to \nudge" people to make \better" decisions (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008). However, this inevitability leads to the delicate issue which
forms of intervention are ethically acceptable. First of all, the idea of pater-
nalistic intervention rests on the view that on the one hand, individuals make
suboptimal decisions { a claim not universally accepted (Berg and Gigerenzer
2010) { and that on the other hand, economists know what would be better
for them. Unfortunately, economists, too, are imperfect human beings with
their own shortcomings, agenda and biases. While there may be examples
where the benets seem obvious and the interference negligible, e.g. when
employing default options to steer behavior (Johnson and Goldstein 2003;
Cronqvist and Thaler 2004), economists must not shy away from the scrutiny.
In particular, insight about how our brains, hormones, and genes inuence
behavior will eventually provide social planers with tools that seemed like
science ction not too long ago. Consider the following, slightly exaggerated
(?) example: Trust is known to be an important determinant of a society's
economic performance (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997), so it would be socially
desirable if people trusted each other more. A simple way to accomplish
this would be to release the neuromodulator oxytocin, a hormone known to
increase trust (Kosfeld et al. 2005; Zak et al. 2005), into the water supply. If
that sounds preposterous to you, consider that you can actually buy perfume
enhanced with oxytocin and other hormones that is explicitly marketed for
business meetings, negotiations and blind dates.3
1.4 Three Essays on Social Preferences
The following chapters present three essays dealing with dierent aspects of
social preferences. The rst essay Social Utility Functions: Where Do We
Stand, How Did We Get There, and Where to Next? surveys the literature
on social preference models. After briey looking at elementary groundwork
from economics and psychology, we review the development of interdependent
utility functions in their historical contexts. The survey is divided into three
main parts. The rst part looks at various outcome-based models, followed
by an overview of models based on the concept of reciprocity. All remaining
models are subsumed in the third part. Additionally, we summarize the main
criticism leveled at social preference models before assessing the current state
of the research eld and its future prospects.
3See http://www.pherolife.com/html/faqs.html (Retrieved 12. Dec. 2012).
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In the second essay A Closer Look at Inequity Aversion and Incentives in
Tournaments, we conduct a theoretical analysis of a tournament model with
inequity averse agents. It extends Grund and Sliwka's (2005) article on the
same topic by comparing the results of the two models of social preferences
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and by allowing
more than just two agents to compete in the tournament. While the model
of Fehr and Schmidt yields an incentive eect in two-agent-tournaments, the
model of Bolton and Ockenfels does not. In multi-agent-tournaments with
two prize levels, inequity averse agents show a relative preference for the
prize given to the majority. The principal should therefore optimally design
tournaments to have many winners to exploit this eect. On the other hand,
in tournaments with many losers, incentives may be distorted to such a degree
that agents actually prefer losing the tournament and exert no eort.
Finally, the third essay Does Altruism Depend on Rational Expectations?
presents an experiment on the eect of rational expectations on altruistic
behavior. In a simple dictator game setting, the dictator's endowment is
randomly determined by a 50-50 lottery. The main treatment condition
compares the transfer of dictators who received the same endowment, but
faced dierent expected outcomes in the lottery. The theory predicts that
dictators receiving more than their expected outcome transfer more money
to the receiver than dictators receiving less than their expected outcome.
However, the results conrm the hypothesis only weakly. Additionally, we
do not nd any evidence for the \warm glow" of altruistic giving. Possible
improvements for a follow-up experiment are also discussed.
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2 Social Utility Functions: Where Do We
Stand, How Did We Get There, and Where
to Next?
2.1 Introduction
Economic models traditionally assumed that each individual's utility function
is strictly independent of other people's payos, intentions, or behavior. Even
though on occasion, the odd economist ventured beyond the narrow horizon
of material self-interest, mainstream economics was mostly satised with the
traditional homo oeconomicus model as long as it yielded reasonably precise
predictions. However, the end of the 20th century saw a paradigm shift as
results from laboratory experiments persistently contradicted the predictions
of the purely self-interested model. After an initial period of skepticism,
the tidal wave of empirical evidence unleashed by the rst experiments on
ultimatum bargaining (Guth et al. 1982; Binmore et al. 1985) eventually
washed away most major resistance. Today, it is widely accepted that people
are motivated by other-regarding preferences and that these preferences can
have important economic consequences (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002).
However, demonstrating that people have social preference is only the rst
step; using this knowledge for economic analysis and deriving predictions
from it is the next. Despite the close aliation with rationality, material
self-interest is actually not an essential part of rational choice theory, only a
simplifying assumption (Sen 1977; Mullainathan and Thaler 2001). In fact,
social preferences generally do not contradict the axioms of rationality, i.e.,
completeness and transitivity of preference relations or the weak axiom of
revealed preference.4 Hence, in principle it is possible to construct well-
behaved utility functions accounting for other-regarding concerns.
Over the years, economists have developed many dierent social prefer-
ence models accounting for a wide spectrum of behavioral patterns. This
paper takes stock of the social utility functions proposed in these models and
4Sen (1993) shows that there can be instances in social choice (among other domains)
when preferences may appear to violate these axioms. For example, people with positional
preferences may want to receive a payo as high as possible, but not the highest one (in
order not to appear greedy). Adding a new highest payo to the choice set changes the
decision, even though the new payo is not chosen itself, thus violating the weak axiom of
revealed preferences.
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reviews them in their historical and topical contexts. The survey is limited
to models with functional representation because a broader approach would
inevitably require skipping more models, especially if including formative
inuences from outside of economics. Furthermore, the utility function typi-
cally captures the essence of a model more concisely and with more precision
than any verbal synopsis. Finally, it appears that the research on social
utility functions is at a crossroads. Firstly, the body of work has not yet
reached dimensions rendering the attempt at a relatively complete overview
impossible. Secondly, the seminal articles of Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002) have
now been published for at least a decade and are arguably still the most
inuential works on the topic, making this a good time to ask the question
quo vadis?
This survey does not cover completely \ego-centric" utility functions of
social behavior found in the classical public good literature (e.g. Samuel-
son 1954), in the model of warm-glow giving by Andreoni (1989), or in the
crowding-out model by Benabou and Tirole (2006). Neither does it cover
theories that do not employ a functional form like Konow's theory of eco-
nomic fairness (1996). It also cannot attempt to give an exhaustive overview
of the experimental evidence for social preferences in general or for any model
in particular. Experiments are discussed briey if they are relevant for un-
derstanding the historical context or motivation of a model, but such occur-
rences (or lack thereof) are no indication of an experiment's quality or overall
signicance.
The survey is divided into three main categories: Outcome-based models,
reciprocity models, and other models that to not belong of either of the rst
two categories. Within the categories, the presentation is mainly chrono-
logical, but departures from a strict timeline occur to group related models
together. This survey thus adds another chapter to the review literature on
social behavior in economics, which includes topics such as distributive jus-
tice (Schokkaert 1992; Konow 2003), philanthropy (Andreoni 2006), or gift
exchange (Fehr et al. 1998), to name just a few. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and
Cooper and Kagel (2009) give more general overviews on social preferences,
while handbooks on behavioral economics (Gilad and Kaish 1986; Camerer
2003; Altman 2006) or experimental economics (Roth and Erev 1995) oer
an even broader perspective on the role of social preferences in economics.
The remainder of the survey is structured as follows. Section 2.2 intro-
duces the notation used throughout the text and briey outlines the key
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experimental games on which much of the literature on social preferences
relies. The following four sections review social utility models. First, section
2.3 presents work by economists and psychologists predating the paradigm
shift in the 1980s. Next, section 2.4 and 2.5 survey outcome-based models
and reciprocity models, respectively. All remaining models are presented in
section 2.6. The critics of social preferences models have their say in section
2.7 before section 2.8 summarizes the status quo and attempts to forecast
what lies ahead.
2.2 Preliminary Remarks
2.2.1 Notation
Hardly any two models use the same kind of notation, so keeping each model's
original notation would create a lot of confusion. We therefore adjust recur-
ring mathematical expressions to t into the same notational framework.
Model-specic variables, however, usually remain as in the original paper
unless overlapping requires renaming. Generally, f1; 2; : : : ; Ng denotes the
set of individuals and fx1; x2; : : : ; xNg denotes an allocation of material pay-
os out of the set X of possible allocations. Individual i has a social utility
function if under any circumstances, his utility Ui is aected by another
individual's payo, i.e., formally
9 fxi; xj 6=ig; fxi; x0j 6=ig 2 X : Ui(xi; xj 6=i; s) 6= Ui(xi; x0j 6=i; s); (1)
with xj 6=i 6= x0j 6=i and s denoting the vector of relevant circumstances. For
outcome-based models, the vector s is irrelevant, so the existential quanti-
cation (1) simplies to Ui(xi; xj 6=i) 6= Ui(xi; x0j 6=i). For reciprocity models, s
usually contains some measurement of kindness of j, which can for example
depend on i's beliefs about j's intentions or inherent traits or on observed
behavior of j. In other models, the relevant element of s might be a social
norm, self perception, observability, etc.
2.2.2 Games
Over the last decades, experimental economists have devised a myriad of
dierent games to analyze certain aspects of social preferences. However, the
most fundamental games in the literature are the following: The ultimatum
game, the dictator game, the public goods game, the prisoner's dilemma,
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the trust game, and the gift-exchange game. The following paragraph briey
introduces the rules of these games.
In the ultimatum game, a proposer i proposes an allocation fxi; xjg of
an endowment E > 0 between himself and a receiver j so that xj = E   xi.
If the receiver accepts, the proposed allocation is implemented, otherwise
both players receive nothing. The only subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium is
fE   "; "g, accept, i.e., the proposer oers the receiver the smallest possible
positive amount and the receiver accepts. In the dictator game, the dictator
i also chooses an allocation fxi; xj) of an endowment E > 0 between himself
and the receiver j, but the allocation is immediately implemented without
any reaction by the receiver. Purely self-interested dictators always keep the
whole endowment.
In the standard public goods game, N  2 players receive an endowment
E which they can invest into the public good or keep for themselves. The
total invested amount is multiplied withm > 1 and distributed evenly among
all N players. The public goods game constitutes a social dilemma because
it is individually optimal to invest nothing, but socially optimal to invest the
whole endowment. Another social dilemma game is the prisoner's dilemma,
which is a two player normal-form game in which each player has two strate-
gies, cooperate and defect. Defect strictly dominates cooperate, i.e., it yields
a higher payo irrespective of the other player's strategy, yet each player's
payo from mutual cooperation is higher than from mutual defection.
In the trust game, the investor i and the trustee j initially receive an
endowment E. In the rst period, the investor can send any amount of money
up to E to the trustee. The amount is then multiplied with a factor m > 1
and added to the trustee's endowment. In the second period, the trustee can
send any amount of money back to the investor. Standard theory predicts
that in the second period, j keeps all money for himself and in anticipation
of that behavior, i does not send any money in the rst period. Finally, the
gift-exchange game is essentially a variant of the trust game in which the
eciency gains are induced by the second mover's action. In the standard
version, buyers make price oers for a good and upon acceptance, sellers make
a costly eort choice determining the good's quality and thereby the buyer's
payo. The game comes in a simple two-player version and a competitive
market version, but the standard prediction always remains that the sellers
choose the lowest possible eort level and buyers oer the lowest possible
price.
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2.3 Early Social Preference Models
2.3.1 Early Works from Economics
Back in 1881, Edgeworth devotes a section in the appendix of his Mathemat-
ical Psychics to \mixed modes of utilitarianism", noting that between pure
selshness and pure utilitarianism there are those \for whom ... his neigh-
bor's happiness as compared with his own neither counts for nothing, not yet
'counts for one', but counts for a fraction."5 He also explicitly expresses this
idea earlier in a footnote commenting on the utilitarian arrangement on the
contract curve, remarking that \if contractors [are] in a sensible degree not
'economic' agents, but actuated ... by a sympathy with each other's interests
... we might suppose that the object which X ... tends ... to maximize, is
not P [own utility], but P +  [other's utility]; where  is a coecient of
eective sympathy" (emphasis as in the original).6 Edgeworth continues to
describe the eects of such preferences on the contract curve, which remains
the same but with narrower limits. As  approaches 1, preferences become
perfectly utilitarian and the contract curve collapses into a single point.
Following the paradigm shift toward the selsh model propelled by Pareto
and his followers (see Bruni and Sugden 2007), Edgeworth's remarks are
mostly forgotten until Frisch (1971) and Collard (1975) resume and extend
Edgeworth's original idea.7 Until the 1970s, however, interdependent utility
functions largely disappear from economics, with Johnson (1952), who looks
at the eects of relative income on consumption, one of the few noticeable
exceptions. At this point, most economists who formally deal with social
preferences typically keep utility functions nonspecic and discuss only in-
dierence curves.8 Some of the more inuential examples of such endeavors
include the works of Schwartz (1970), Scott (1972), and Becker (1974).
Schwartz notices that even when person i, ceteris paribus, prefers that
person j consumes more, person i's behavior in equilibrium under budget
constraint does not necessarily have to reect that positive attitude. A sim-
ilar point is stressed by Scott: Even when individual i generally prefers the
5Appendix IV, page 102.
6Page 16.
7It is unclear whether Frisch was aware of Edgeworth's remarks as his article (written
in German) does not mention the Mathematical Psychics.
8While this can provide certain insights, it is generally a limited approach because it
is dicult to derive predictions from indierence curves, especially when the parameters
used to estimate them change.
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other enjoying an equal level of consumption when holding constant own con-
sumption, i is nevertheless unwilling to implement an equal allocation given
a xed budget.9 Becker examines a model of household behavior in which
individual i's utility depends both on own welfare and on the welfare of i's
spouse. In equilibrium, i transfers income to the spouse until i's marginal
utilities from both own and the spouse's consumption are equal. Therefore, a
change in distribution of household income has no eect on the consumption
and welfare of either member as long as i is still willing to make transfers.
Becker also discusses welfare implications if individuals are envious, i.e., if
they are worse o the higher the other person's payo and are therefore
willing to incur costs to harm others.10
Other approaches even break with traditional utility theory. For example,
Margolis (1982) proposes that individuals have two utility functions S and
G; one representing self-interest and one representing welfare concerns for
the individual's social group. The allocation of resources to both domains
occurs such that the ratios of marginal utilities in the group domain G0 and
in the self-interest domain S 0 are equal to a weight W . The weight W itself
is a function of the ratio of the resources allocated to the group and to the
self, respectively, so that the weight on group welfare increases the more
resources are allocated to the self and vice versa. Margolis uses the model
to solve traditional puzzles of economics such as public good provision or
voting.
Public good provision is also the main concern of Sugden's model (1984).
The model subjects utility maximization to a constraint which Sugden calls
the principle of reciprocity. It demands that an individual contributes either
the minimum of all other contributions to the public good or the amount the
individual would most prefer everyone else to contribute, whichever is lower.
2.3.2 Early Works from Other Disciplines
Much of the initial groundwork on social utility functions is laid by psychol-
ogists and sociologists whose analysis is not manacled by the assumption of
narrowly self-interested behavior. At the outset, Festinger (1954) demon-
9Such indierent curves are created by Bolton and Ockenfels' ERC-model (2000), for
example.
10Contrary to models in which envy is only experienced toward others whose payos
exceed one's own, envy in Becker's model increases in the other's income irrespective of
the relative standing.
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strates that individuals engage in social comparison to form judgments, al-
though he focuses only on the evaluation of opinions and abilities. Later,
Adams (1963, 1965) develops equity theory, which assumes that workers
dislike not being compensated equitably compared to their co-workers and
therefore strive to maintain the following relation
own outcome
own input
=
other's outcome
other's input
: (2)
Arguably the rst concrete social utility function after Edgeworth is pro-
posed by Wyer (1969), who estimates individual utility for outcomes in sev-
eral normal-form two-person-games. He propose that people maximize a
utility function given by
Ui = w1xi + w2(1  )xi + w3xj; (3)
where  is a step function equaling 1 if xi > 0 and 0 if xi  0. The two
weights on own payo w1 > 0 and w2 > 0 allow for loss aversion and the
weight w3 on other's payo may be positive (altruistic), zero (individualistic),
or negative (competitive). However, Wyer only looks at strategic games in
which own behavior strongly depends on expectations about other's behavior
and in which reciprocity concerns are very likely to play a crucial role. He
nds a fairly linear correlation between outcomes and their desirability, but
the model's explanatory power is rather weak even in its specic context.
Nevertheless, Wyer's model can in principle explain both positive transfers
in dictator games (if w3 > 0) and rejections in ultimatum games (if w3 < 0),
though not individuals who do both.
A more elaborate utility function emerges from the literature on social
value orientations (Messick and McClintock 1968; Griesinger and Livingston
Jr. 1973). This theory assumes that individuals can have ve dierent mo-
tivations when making decisions over own and other's payos; the desire to
maximize the payo of others (altruism), maximize joint payo (coopera-
tion), maximize own payo (individualism), maximize own payo relative
to other's payo (competition), or minimizing other's payo (aggression or
sadism).11 Motivations can be elicited and mapped onto a circle in an own-
other outcome space similar to Figure 1, with the resulting motivational
11Griesinger and Livingston Jr. (1973) initially also include the desire to minimize joint
payo (sadomasochism), minimize own payo (masochism) and minimize own payo rel-
ative to other's payo (martyrdom). However, such motivations are virtually non-existing
and are therefore usually dropped later.
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vector determining the individual's type. Based on that framework, Lurie
(1987) suggests the following utility function:
Ui = xi cos + xj sin; (4)
where  is the angle of the motivational vec-
Figure 1: Social Value
Orientation
Classications
tor to the horizontal line. When choosing be-
tween two allocations, an individual with such
preferences picks the allocation with the longer
orthogonal projection onto his motivational vec-
tor. Additionally, Lurie discusses a social orien-
tation involving both utilitarian and egalitarian
concerns and eventually proposes a function that
includes both an allocation's projection onto the
motivational vector and the distance to it:
Ui = f(P )  k1En1   (1  )k2En2 ; (5)
where n1; n2; k1; k2 > 0. For an allocation fxi; xjg, the projection P is
xi cos+xj sin and the distance E is jxi sin xj cosj. The step function
 equals 1 if fxi; xjg lies above the motivational vector and 0 if it lies below,
allowing for dierent sensitivities toward favorable and unfavorable deviation
from the preferred vector. Despite the originality of Lurie's approach, it has
not received much attention from economists or psychologist.
In a more inuential study, Loewenstein et al. (1989) estimate several
social utility functions using subjects' stated satisfaction with dierent hy-
pothetical outcomes for the self and a partner while manipulating relation-
ship background and status between treatments. The function with the best
t depends on the dierences in payos and allows for dierent weights on
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality:
Ui = c+b1xi + b2 max[xj   xi; 0] + b3 (max[xj   xi; 0])2+
b4 max[xi   xj; 0] + b5 (max[xi   xj; 0])2
(6)
On average over all treatments, utility decreases as the dierence between
payos increases (bk < 0 for k = f2; 4g), but with diminishing sensitivity
(bk > 0 for k = f3; 5g) and disadvantageous deviations looming larger than
advantageous deviations (b2 < b4). In some treatments, however, utility ac-
tually increases on average when receiving more than the partner (b4 > 0),
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namely when the relationship is framed as negative or as a business rela-
tionship. Generally, while disadvantageous deviations are disliked across-
the-board, individual reactions to advantageous deviations are much more
context-dependent. Although the study has several shortcomings12, it fore-
shadows the development of inequity aversion models and adds to their va-
lidity.
2.4 Outcome-Based Models
In the late 1970s, economists become increasingly interested in bargaining
research (Selten 1978; Roth et al. 1981; Rubinstein 1982) after a series of
experiments conducted by social psychologists (e.g. Fouraker and Siegel 1963;
Nydegger and Owen 1974; Rapoport et al. 1977) appears to at least partly
contradict the game-theoretic bargaining model by Nash (1950). Economists
initially try to reconcile the experimental results with the theory by focusing
on the availability of information to the bargainers (Roth and Malouf 1979;
Roth and Murnighan 1982), but the importance of \sociological factors"
is already hinted at by Roth et al. (1981). In 1982, Guth et al. publish
the results of their ultimatum game experiments, which triggers a series of
follow-up studies (e.g. Binmore et al. 1985; Neelin et al. 1988; Ochs and Roth
1989), eventually leaving economists with several systematic deviations from
standard theory:
 Proposers' oers are typically closer to the equal split than predicted
by subgame perfect equilibrium.
 A high number of positive but unequal oers is rejected.
 In two-period games with alternating roles and individual discount
rates
{ counteroers often leave the second-round proposer with a lower
payo than the previously rejected oer.
{ the discount rate of the rst-round proposer inuences the out-
come, even though it should be irrelevant.
{ the rst-round proposer consistently receives at least as much as
the second-round proposer, even if the rst oer is rejected.
12Most notably, the study lacks any monetary incentives, which raises social desirability
and demand eect concerns.
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While some ascribe the results to bounded rationality (see section 2.7),
others instead call the assumption of material self-interest into question. For
example, Ochs and Roth (1989) speculate that subjects might have a mon-
etary threshold and refuse all lower oers. However, that explanation does
not account for disadvantageous counteroers, prompting them to vaguely
suggest to include some measurement of unfairness as deviation from the
equal division into the utility function.
Ochs and Roth's suggestion is eventually implemented by Bolton (1991).
In his model, individuals care about their relative payo as well as their
monetary payo, i.e.
Ui = Ui(xi; p); (7)
where p is the proportional index, which is 1 if both individuals receive
nothing and xi
xj
otherwise.13 According to the model's assumption, Ui is
strictly increasing in own monetary payo xi and strictly increasing in p as
long as p < 1 (if p  1, Ui2 = 0). In other words, ceteris paribus, individuals
prefer more money over less, prefer to be closer to the equal split when they
receive less than the other, and do not care about changes in relative payo
as long as they receive at least as much as the other. Notably, the model
is able to explain all ve puzzles from the ultimatum game experiments. In
particular, disadvantageous counteroers can now be explained by subjects
trading o lower monetary payo for higher relative payo.14
Kirchsteiger (1994) proposes an alternative explanation. He assumes that
people are envious such that their utility is strictly decreasing in other's
payo, i.e., @Ui=@xj < 0. However, people care more about their own payo
than the other's, i.e., Ui(x; x) > Ui(0; 0) 8 x > 0. In other words, any positive
equal split is better than zero payo for both players. Kirchsteiger initially
suggests the utility function
Ui = xi   axj; (8)
13Bolton primarily develops his model in the context of a two-period alternating-oer
bargaining game and his notation is geared toward this scenario. The simplied notation
accounts for all central aspects of his model, but is more accessible when coming from a
general point-of-view.
14Bolton also extends his model further to a game where individuals compare their
payo not with their direct bargaining partner, but with another person in the same role.
However, the extension is very specic and relatively complex, so it is skipped here. A
similar idea is later formalized by Ho and Su (2009).
26
with 0 < a < 1, which only explains four of the ve ultimatum game puzzles.
He then adds the assumption that the envy parameter a is actually a function
of own payo xi with a(0) < 1, @a(xi)=@xi < 0, and a(xi) > 0 8 xi  0.
As own payo increases, the negative weight on the other's payo decreases,
although it never changes signs. This addition allows Kirchsteiger to explain
the rst mover advantage and, additionally, that oers with a given ratio of
own to other's payo are less likely to be rejected as the stakes are increased.15
Shortly thereafter, the dictator game experiments by Forsythe et al.
(1994) further substantiate the assumption that many individuals are moti-
vated by other-regarding concerns, yet they also bring along a new puzzle:
The same people who are willing to pay to decrease others' payos as receivers
in the ultimatum game are also willing to pay to increase others' payos as
dictators, with some transferring up to half of their endowment. Unable to
explain the dictators' behavior, Bolton's and Kirchsteiger's models are al-
ready rendered obsolete. Yet the puzzle eventually gives rise to two models
of inequity aversion which rene the concepts of the two early models to
reconcile ultimatum game rejections with dictator game giving. The rst of
these models is the theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Fehr and Schmidt assert that individuals experience
self-centered inequity aversion, i.e., they suer when another person's payo
diers from theirs, but do not care about inequity among others' payos. In
the N -player case, the model's utility function is
Ui = xi   i 1
N   1
X
i6=j
max[xj   xi; 0]  i 1
N   1
X
i6=j
max[xi   xj; 0]; (9)
with  the strength of disadvantageous inequity aversion (envy) and  the
strength of advantageous inequity aversion (compassion). Fehr and Schmidt
assume   , i.e., envy looms larger than compassion, and 0   < 1, i.e.,
people do not destroy their own payo to decrease their costs of compassion.
The selsh case is nested within the model for  =  = 0.
The second model of inequity aversion is the theory of equity, reciprocity,
and competition (ERC) by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Like Bolton's com-
parative model of bargaining, it is based on monetary and relative payo, but
ERC makes some crucial modications. It assumes that individuals maximize
15The empirical evidence for the latter is actually relatively weak, see for example Ho-
man et al. (1996), Slonim and Roth (1998), or Cameron (1999).
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a \motivation function" given by
Ui = Ui(xi; i); (10)
where i is i's relative share of the total payo X of all N individuals, i.e.,
i = xi= X or i = 1=N if X = 0. The function is increasing in xi, i.e.,
individuals prefer more money over less when holding their relative share
constant. Furthermore, Ui is concave in i and has its maximum at i =
1
N
,
i.e., individuals prefer to receive the equal split when holding constant own
monetary payo. The main dierences to the Fehr-Schmidt-model are the
following: The ERC-model is an incomplete information model, individuals
do not care about the distribution of others' payos, and the model is silent
on dierences between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.16 To
help intuitive understanding of their model, Bolton and Ockenfels also oer
an exemplary function for N -player games:
Ui = aixi   bi
2

xi
X
  1
N
2
; (11)
with ai  0 and bi  0.17 For a=b = 0, individuals are strictly relativistic
and for a=b!1 strictly self-interested.
What distinguishes both models is that they are not just consistent with
dictator and ultimatum games, but with a wide range of dierent experimen-
tal results, including altruistic punishment in public goods games (Ostrom
et al. 1992; Fehr and Gachter 2000), reciprocal responses in the trust game
or the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993; Berg et al. 1995), and, in partic-
ular, seemingly self-interested behavior in competitive market environments
(Smith 1962; Roth et al. 1991; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992). There is,
however, one systematic behavioral pattern that both models cannot explain.
In dictator games with ecient giving, i.e., when giving up x increases the
other's payo by more than x, a signicant number of people are willing to
16The irrelevance of the distribution of others' payos is motivated by the results of
three-person ultimatum games conducted by Guth and Van Damme (1998) and results of
the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). In the former, subjects show little
concern for the inactive third player, and in the latter, voluntary giving to \losers" with
low payos is largely independent of the number of \losers", suggesting that individuals
are primarily concerned with the fairness of their own payo.
17Individuals with these preferences will keep (0:5+a=b) in the dictator game and reject
any oer lower than 0.5 -
p
ab+a2 a
b in the ultimatum game.
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increase the other's payos even when it increases disadvantageous inequity
(Charness and Grosskopf 2001; Kritikos and Bolle 2001).
Such behavior is particularly evident in a study by Andreoni and Miller
(2002), who examine whether people's social preferences are well-behaved,
i.e., if they adhere to the generalized axiom of revealed preferences (GARP18)
and if they can be represented by a continuous, convex, and monotonic util-
ity function. They let subjects play modied dictator games with varying
endowments and transfer rates. The resulting budget lines cross to allow
potential violations of GARP. Nearly half of their subjects are perfectly de-
scribed by selsh, Rawlsian, or utilitarian preferences. To estimate prefer-
ences for the remaining subjects, they employ a social utility function with
constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
Ui = (ax

i + (1  a)xj )
1
 ; (12)
where a is a measure of selshness and  captures the convexity of prefer-
ences. The function allows for perfectly selsh (a = 1), perfectly Rawlsian
(a = 0:5;  =  1), and perfectly utilitarian (a = 0:5;  = 1) preferences as
well as mixed types. Andreoni and Miller conclude that people have heteroge-
neous but typically well-behaved preferences as less than 2% of their subjects
violate GARP, demonstrating that altruism is in principle compatible with
neoclassical preferences.
Around the same time, Charness and Rabin (2002) design a range of
experiments to directly compare social preference models and conclude that
welfare concerns explain behavior better than inequality aversion because
reducing others' payo to reduce disadvantageous inequality appears to be
rare, even when relatively cheap. They propose a social utility function which
includes concerns for the individual with the lowest payo as well as concerns
for eciency,
Ui =(1  )xi+
 [ min[x1; x2; : : : ; xn] + (1  )  (x1 + x2 + : : :+ xn)] ;
(13)
18To explain GARP, it is rst required to dene the terms directly revealed preferred
and indirectly revealed preferred. If B is in the choice set when A is chosen, A is directly
revealed preferred to B. If A is directly revealed preferred to C, and C is directly revealed
preferred to B, then A is indirectly revealed preferred to B. GARP says that if A is indirectly
revealed preferred to B, then B is not strictly directly revealed preferred to A, i.e., A is not
strictly within the budget set when B is chosen. GARP allows for non-strict convexity of
preferences. For a more detailed discussion, see the article by Andreoni and Miller.
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where 0    1 measures the degree of social welfare concern versus self-
interest and 0    1 the degree of Rawlsian concern (maximin) versus
eciency concern. The model generally predicts transfers of own payo to
those worst o, but can also explain transfers to those better o when such
a transfer is eciency increasing.
Straightaway, researchers set out to test the predictive power of inequity
aversion against social welfare concerns (e.g. Guth et al. 2003; Engelmann
and Strobel 2004), spurring on a spirited debate between advocates for both
sides (Fehr et al. 2004; Bolton and Ockenfels 2006; Engelmann and Strobel
2006). To some degree, the issue is still unresolved as the controversy about
relative importance of each objective continues (e.g. Daruvala 2010; Blanco
et al. 2011).
From this point on, most new outcome-based models are just modica-
tions of one of the three major models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). Typically, the original function
receives at least one additional component, which allows the new model to
better explain certain experimental data, albeit at the cost of additional free
parameters. For example, Frohlich et al. (2004) add the concepts of \just
desert" and \doubt" to the Fehr-Schmidt-model. When the dictator's en-
dowment is produced by both players, the \just desert" is the proportion of
the endowment generated by each player. \Doubt" is the degree to which the
dictator doubts the authenticity of the game.19 A dictator's utility function
is
Ui = xi    max[xj   xi; 0]    max[xi   xj; 0]
   max[pi   xi; 0]    max[pj   xj; 0];
(14)
where pi is player i's just desert,  > 0 and  > 0 the weight on negative
deviation from own and other's just desert, respectively, and  the \doubt"
discount with 0    1.
Another extension is undertaken by Tan and Bolle (2006), who again
look at dictator games with varying transfer rates to disentangle altruistic
and fairness concerns. They employ an ERC-type function which depends
exclusively on relative payos and add an altruism term to the function.
They arrive at the following utility function
Ui =
xi
E
+ a
xj
E
  b
2
xi
E
  xj
E
2
; (15)
19For example, the dictator may doubt that there really is a recipient or that he really
is responsible for his portion the endowment.
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where a < 1 and b  0 are weights on altruistic concern and fairness concern,
respectively. E is the normalized endowment, which is given by E = E1+tE1
2
,
where t is the transfer rate and E1 is the initial endowment.
20 Tan and
Bolle conclude that their model describes their experimental data better
than altruism and fairness concerns alone.
Furthermore, Ho and Su (2009) look at peer-induced fairness concerns by
sequentially playing two independent ultimatum games with one proposer
and two responders. They nd that the second responder is averse to receiv-
ing less than the rst receiver. This result prompts Ho and Su to propose a
utility function for the second responder k given by
Uk =
(
xk    max[0; xi   xk]   p^(z) max[0; x^j   xk] if oer is accepted.
0 if oer is rejected.
(16)
xi is proposer i's payo from the ultimatum game played with k, z is the
imperfect signal of i's previous oer to the rst responder j, p^(z) is k's
subjective probability that j accepted i's oer, and x^j is k's expectation
about j payo given the signal and acceptance of the oer.   0 and
  0 represent k's strength of envy toward i and j, respectively. Removing
uncertainty, function (16) simplies to
Uk = xk    max[0; xi   xk]   max[0; x^j   xk]; (17)
which is essentially the Fehr-Schmidt-model with dierent -parameters to-
ward proposer and second receiver.
Chen and Li (2009) analyze the results of their experiment on in-group
out-group dierences of social preferences by taking Charness and Rabin's
two-person utility function and adding group identity to it, arriving at
Ui = (1  r   s)xi + [(1 + Ia)r + (1 + Ib)s]xj; (18)
where r and s are a step functions that are 1 if xi > xj and if xi < xj,
respectively, and 0 otherwise.  and  are weights put on the other's payo
compared to own payo when i is ahead and behind, respectively. I is also
20A transfer rate of t means that for each point the dictator gives up, the receiver's
payo increase by t. For t =1, the dictator's payo is always 0 and the recipient's payo
lies between 0 and 8. For t = 0, it is the other way around.
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a step function that is 1 if players i and j belong to the same group and
0 otherwise. Hence, through a and b, people can put dierent weights on
the other's payo depending on group aliation. Chen and Li then use
their data to estimate the parameters, nding that subjects generally put a
signicantly higher weight on the other's payo if the two players belong to
the same group, both in distribution games and in a reciprocity game.
Before we conclude this section, let us be reminiscent of two models that
essentially were already obsolete upon their publication. Some theories, such
as Bolton's and Kirchsteiger's, have largely sunken into oblivion, but they
constitute important interim stages in the development of more complete
models and provided original concepts that advanced the academic discourse.
In contrast, the following two models have had very little impact on the eld.
They are presented here to illustrate that the research eld at that time was
wide open. Even though in hindsight, the ideas may appear idiosyncratic, at
the time they were considered worthwhile enough to warrant publication.
Building primarily on ultimatum game experiments, Burnell et al. (1999)
suggest that players view each other as rivals and, ceteris paribus, prefer to
maximize the distance between own and other's payo. The following utility
function represents these preferences:
Ui = xi + a(xi   xj); (19)
with a  0. It follows that responders in the ultimatum game reject an oer
below the equal split if the payo dierence becomes too large. Proposers
make higher oers than predicted by standard theory to avoid rejections,
although 50-50 oers require very strong risk aversion. Burnell et al. are
already aware of the dictator game results, which are incompatible with their
model because it predicts that dictators always keep the whole pie. They
therefore argue that players try to build a positive reputation for future
interaction (even though games are played anonymously) and adjust their
model to include expected payos from these future interactions.
Costa-Gomes and Zauner (2001), too, are predominantly concerned with
two-player bargaining games. In their model, a player's utility consists of a
linear combination of both player's payos and a noise term, i.e.,
Ui;k = xi;k + aixj;k + "i;k; (20)
where k is the terminal node of the game, "i;k an independent (across players
and nodes) random variable with mean 0, and ai 2 R player i's weight on
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player j's payo. Costa-Gomes and Zauner use data from Roth et al. (1991)
to estimate ai, but their estimates postulate that most people are spiteful
(i.e., ai < 0), which is inconsistent with dictator game results.
2.5 Reciprocity Models
Reciprocity models are based on the assumption that people want to pay
like with like, i.e., be kind toward others who treat them kindly and unkind
toward others who treat them unkindly. Reciprocity is not, however, based
on expectations of future material benets. Compared to outcome-based
models, the development of reciprocity models sees less dramatic change
over time because the main experimental evidence for reciprocal behavior
is relatively consistent. Five experimental games constitute the main body
of evidence. First, many people make positive contributions in one-shot
public good games, but their willingness to contribute is typically not driven
by altruism, but contingent on their beliefs about other people's behavior
(reviews in Dawes and Thaler 1988; Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). Second,
rejections in the ultimatum game can be viewed not (only) as an expression
of discontent with an unequal payo distribution per se, but as punishment
for an unkind oer (Falk et al. 2003). Third, in one-shot or nitely repeated
prisoner's dilemma games, a large portion of people cooperate as long as
their partner also cooperates (Krebs et al. 1982; Andreoni and Miller 1993).
Fourth, in the gift-exchange game by Fehr et al. (1993), responders on average
choose higher eorts the higher the buyer's oer. And nally, in the trust
game, the trustee's back transfer typically increases in the investor's initial
transfer (Berg et al. 1995).
Among the dierent approaches proposed to capture utility from reci-
procity, the earliest concepts are based on intentions.21 Standard utility
theory assumes that an action is only judged depending on its consequences,
not on the intentions behind it. Intention-based models do away with that
21There is some ambiguity in the word intention. Sometimes it describes what a person
plans to do, sometimes what the person plans to achieve. The dierence can be relevant
for how others perceive the person's kindness. For example, a proposer in the ultimatum
game may oer the equal split because she likes to be fair or because she fears rejection
and would actually prefer to keep the whole pie. According to the rst interpretation, the
proposer's oer is kind in both cases, whereas according to the second interpretation, only
the rst proposer is kind. The intention-based models in this section tend to follow the
rst interpretation.
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assumption and therefore constitute a more radical departure from economic
tradition than outcome-based models. To incorporate intentions into the
utility function, the models employ psychological game theory (Geanakoplos
et al. 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009). In psychological games, util-
ity depends on payos and on own beliefs about others' strategies and their
beliefs. If all criteria of a Nash equilibrium are fullled and in addition, all
beliefs match actual behavior, it constitutes a so-called psychological Nash
equilibrium.
The rst intention-based reciprocity model is developed by Rabin (1993)
for normal form two-player games like the prisoner's dilemma. A player
receives subjective utility depending on his strategy ai, his rst order beliefs
bi about the other player's strategy choice and his second order beliefs ci
about the other player's beliefs about his strategy. Rabin denes a \kindness
function"
fi(ai; bj) =
xj(bj; ai)  xej(bj)
xhj (bj)  xminj (bj)
; (21)
where xhj (bj) and x
min
j (bj) are the highest and lowest possible payos for
player j, respectively, given belief bj, and x
e
j is the \equitable payo", i.e.,
the mean of xhj (bj) and the lowest not Pareto-dominated possible payo for
player j, again given belief bj. Since the function is normalized, it ranges
from  1 (most unkind) to 1
2
(kindest). Player i's beliefs about player j's
kindness is given by
efj(bj; ci) = xi(ci; bj)  xei (ci)
xhi (ci)  xmini (ci)
: (22)
Finally, the players are maximizing the following utility function
Ui = xi(ai; bj) + efj(bj; ci)  [1 + fi(ai; bj)]: (23)
Therefore, if player i believes player j wants to give him less than the
equitable payo (efj() < 0), he wants to give player j as little as possible
(holding constant own monetary payo) and vice versa. Since both kind-
ness functions are bounded, behavior becomes less sensitive to reciprocal
concerns the bigger the material stakes get. Rabin refers to psychological
Nash equilibiria in his model as fairness equilibria and notes that any Nash
equilibrium that is either mutual-max (each player maximizing the other's
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payo) or mutual-min (each player minimizing the other's payo) is also a
fairness equilibrium. Roughly, if material payo is small, all fairness equilib-
ria are mutual-max or mutual-min and if material payo is large, all fairness
equilibria are Nash equilibria.
One noteworthy application of Rabin's model is undertaken by Dickinson
(2000). Though not a normal-form game, he applies the model with minor
formal adjustments to the ultimatum game to test it against alternative
explanations (among others Ochs and Roth 1989 and Slonim and Roth 1998).
The model predicts responder behavior well, although proposer behavior is
only weakly supported.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabin's model to extensive
form games withN players. They take into account how beliefs and strategies
can change after the conclusion of a game node, so that strategies are best
responses at all stages. Each player has a set of strategies Ai. Bij = Aj is the
set of possible beliefs of player i about player j's strategy and Cijk = Bjk =
Ak is the set of possible beliefs of player i about player j's beliefs about player
k's strategy. H is the set of possible histories. Then, with ai 2 Ai and h 2 H,
ai(h) is player i's updated strategy after history h. Analogously, bij(h) and
cijk(h) are player i's updated beliefs after h. All updating is Bayesian.
Given player i's beliefs about all other players' strategies (bij)j 6=i, the set
of feasible payos for player j from i's perspective is fxj(a0i; (bij)j 6=i)ja0i 2 Aig.
Then, the kindness of player i toward player j at history h when choosing
strategy ai is dened as
ij(ai(h); (bij(h))j 6=i) = xj(ai(h); (bij(h))j 6=i)  xeij ((bij(h))j 6=i); (24)
with xeij ((bij(h))j 6=i) the \equitable payo", i.e., the mean of the highest
and lowest material payo of player j in the feasible set ignoring inecient
strategies.22 Analogously, player i's beliefs about player j's kindness toward
him at history h are
iji(bij(h); (cijk(h))k 6=j) = xj(bij(h); (cijk(h))k 6=j)  xejj (bij(h); (cijk(h))k 6=j):
(25)
22A strategy is inecient if there exists another strategy that makes every player at
least as well o in every history and at least one player better o in at least one history.
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This leads to the utility function
Ui =xi(ai(h); (bij(h))j 6=i)+X
j2Nnfig
(Yij  ij(ai(h); (bij(h))j 6=i)  iji(bij(h); (cijk(h))k 6=j)) ; (26)
where Yij  0 is player i's reciprocity sensitivity regarding player j. Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger dene a sequential reciprocity equilibrium which re-
quires that each player in each history chooses optimally given his beliefs
and that following each history, beliefs are updated correctly, and that play-
ers' initial beliefs are correct.
Another modication of Rabin's model is made by Falk and Fischbacher
(2006). Like Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, they look at extensive form games
with N players, but they also introduce distributional concerns into their
model. In their two-player model, ~N denotes the set of nodes, ~F the set of
endnotes, ~Ni the set of nodes at which player i moves, and A~n the set of
actions at node ~n.23 P (A~n) is the set of probability distributions over the set
of actions in node ~n, Si =
Q
~n2 ~Ni P (A~n) is player i's behavior strategy space,
and sij~n his strategy conditional on node ~n. The player's expected payo at
node ~n can be dened as xi(~n; si; sk) := xi(sij~n; sjj~n). Finally, s0i are player
i's beliefs about player j's behavior strategy sj and s
00
i are player i's beliefs
about player j's beliefs about player i's strategy. Beliefs are consistent if
si = s
0
j = s
00
i . Beliefs are not updated, only initial beliefs enter utility.
One problem with both Rabin's model and the Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger
model arises from their denition of kindness, which is independent of the sec-
ond player's payo so that equitable allocations may be perceived as unkind.
To address this problem, Falk and Fischbacher measure kindness dierently.
In their model, player i's kindness 'i is composed of an outcome measure-
ment i with i = xj   xi and an intention factor #i with 0  #i  1. If
#i = 1, player i's action is fully intentional.
24 The kindness term 'i is the
23By adding the tilde, we deviate from the original notation of Falk and Fischbacher
because N is used for the number of players throughout the text.
24Intentionality depends on the options player i has. For example, if player i makes a
choice resulting in xi > xj , but another choice would have let to a higher payo for player
j, then the intention factor is 1. If the action is not intentional, the variables takes the
value of the player's pure outcome concern parameter "j (0  "j  1), which measures
player j's pure concern for equitable outcome. If "j > 0, it is possible, for example, that
player j rejects an unequal ultimatum oer even if player i had a singleton choice set when
making the oer.
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product of i and #i, so the kindness at node ~n is
'i(~n; s
00
j ; s
0
j) = #i(~n; s
00
j ; s
0
j) i(~n; s00j ; s0j): (27)
Additionally, the model also contains a reciprocation term i which measures
how much player i alters the payo of player j with his choice at node ~n
leading to end node ~f . It is given by
i(~n; ~f; s
00
i ; s
0
i) = xj(v(~n;
~f); s00i ; s
0
i)  xj(~n; s00i ; s0i); (28)
with v(~n; ~f) the unique node that directly follows ~n on the path to ~f . Player
i's utility is then given by
Ui = xi( ~f) + i
X
~n! ~f
~n2 ~Ni
'j(~n; s
00
i ; s
0
i)| {z }
kindness
i(~n; ~f; s00i ; s0i)| {z }
reciprocation
; (29)
where i is the degree of player i's reciprocity concern with i  0. Ceteris
paribus, players want to decrease the other player's payo if the other player
has been unkind or if the other player receives a higher payo. If the other
player has been kind or if the other player receives a lower payo, players
want to increase the other player's payo. The subgame perfect psychological
Nash equilibrium is called reciprocity equilibrium.
A dierent approach to reciprocity is proposed by Levine (1998), who
assumes that people are inherently altruistic or spiteful and that altruistic
people are generally treated more kindly by others. He postulates the fol-
lowing utility function
Ui = xi +
X
j 6=i
ai + aj
1 + 
xj; (30)
where ai is individual i's coecient of altruism with  1 < ai < 1 and  the
degree of reciprocal concern with 0    1. Individuals can be altruistic
(ai > 0), selsh (ai = 0), or spiteful (ai < 0). If  > 0, individuals have
a higher regard for altruistic individuals than for selsh and spiteful others.
While Levine's model oers improved tractability compared to intention-
based reciprocity models, it is dicult to reconcile with many empirical re-
sults. In the ultimatum game, for example, the majority of people appears to
be spiteful, which contradicts results from dictator games and public goods
games.
37
Sethi and Somanathan (2001) employ Levine's model to develop an evo-
lutionary theory of reciprocity. However, because altruistic individuals can
never put a negative weight on the payo of selsh others in the original
model, they adjust the utility function to
Ui = xi +
X
j 6=i
ai + i(aj   ai)
1 + i
xj: (31)
Additionally, they allow i > 1, so that altruists may be spiteful to self-
ish others and even to others with weaker altruism than themselves. Sethi
and Somanathan then show that given certain environments and parame-
ters, reciprocal altruists (ai > 0;  > 0) can survive in a population that also
contains opportunists (ai = i = 0).
Rotemberg (2008) further modies Levine's idea by assuming that people
are mildly altruistic and additionally expect others to be at least mildly
altruistic, too. If another person fails to be suciently altruistic, people
become angry and enjoy punishing the deviant. Ex-ante, individual i puts
weight i > 0 on person j's payo. However, he expects that j's weight on
i's payo j is at least i > 0. People generally assume that this is the case.
However if person j's actions reveal j < i, person i will become angry,
which decreases i by a certain amount . This leads to the utility function
Uu = E(xi + [
i   (^j; i)]xj); (32)
where E is the expectation operator,  represents risk attitude, and ^j is the
highest possible j consistent with j's actions. The function () is zero if
^j  i and  otherwise. The inclusion of  allows for risk-loving preferences
or \gambling utility" (Conlisk 1993), which allows the model to explain low
oers by proposers in ultimatum games. However, risk-aversion cannot ac-
count for the large portion of 50-50 oers typical for ultimatum games; this
requires people to be more altruistic themselves than they demand others to
be. Rotemberg also remarks that his utility function allows large changes in
attitude, which is supported by neurological ndings (Singer et al. 2006).
The third approach to reciprocity is an extension of the outcome-based
model of Charness and Rabin (2002), which captures both social welfare
concerns and negative reciprocity.25 In the extension, each player has a
25Some experiments suggest that intentions do not matter much for positive reciprocity
(e.g. Bolton et al. 1998a; Oerman 2002; Cox 2004), although others disagree (e.g. Falk
et al. 2008).
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demerit prole d = (d1; :::; dN) with dj 2 [0; 1]. The greater dj, the less
weight other players put on player j's payo. The outcome-based utility
function (13) becomes
Ui = (1  )xi + 
"
 min [xi;minj 6=ifxj + bdjg] +
(1  ) 
 
xi +
X
j 6=i
max[1  kdj; 0]xj
!
  f
X
j 6=i
djxj
#
;
(33)
where b, k, and f are nonnegative parameters. Player j's demerit dj is derived
by comparing the \appropriate" weight put on social welfare  with the
highest possible weight gj that is consistent with player i's chosen strategy
given the prole of strategies and demerits of all other players, i.e., dj =
max[   gj; 0].26 The strategy prole for which each players' strategy is
optimal in expectations and for which a consistent demerit prole d exists is
called reciprocal-fairness equilibrium.
Erlei (2008) also uses the Charness-Rabin approach to model reciprocity
by combining the outcome-based version of the model with Fehr-Schmidt-
type inequity aversion. However, players are not motivated by welfare con-
cerns and inequity aversion at the same time; instead, they are of dierent
types. In two-player games, players' preferences are represented by the fol-
lowing utility function
Ui =
8><>:
(1  t   tr)xi + (t + t()r)xj; xi < xj
(1  t   tr)xi + (t + t()r)xj; xi > xj
(1  tr)xi + t()rxj; xi = xj:
(34)
Each player's type t can be strictly egoistic (SE), i.e., SE = SE = SE = 0,
inequity averse (IA), i.e., IA < 0 < IA < 1, or can have welfare preferences
(WP), i.e., 0 < WP  WP  1. Furthermore, t  0 is the reciprocity
parameter, which is determined by the type of player, the payos, and r,
which is the reciprocity variable with r =  1 if the other player misbehaved
and r = 0 otherwise. Player i regards player j as misbehaving if j's action
violates i's norm and if i cannot obtain at least the same utility as when j
26The non-negativity of dj rules out positive reciprocity.
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had abode by i's norm. Norms are best responses in games in which both
players have identical types. Erlei then applies his model to 43 games and
generally receives better predictions than his three base models.
Finally, Segal and Sobel (2007) propose an axiomatic approach to reci-
procity by assuming that players have preferences over strategies.27 In their
model, player i has a complete, continuous, independent, and transitive pref-
erence relation over his space of mixed strategies i. These preferences de-
pend on the strategies of other players  i and possibly on player i's inter-
pretation of  i or alternatively on the \context" of the game. Context is
summarized in the mixed strategy prole  = (i ; 

 i), which describes the
\conventional" way the game is played or player i's beliefs about how the
other players play.28 Furthermore, players have preferences over outcomes
that satisfy the assumption of expected utility theory and are independent
of the strategic context. All players are self-interested in the sense that when
holding others' material payos constant, they prefer higher monetary payo.
If vi(i; 

 i) is player i's utility from monetary payo, then his preferences
over strategies can be represented by the following utility function
Ui = vi(i; 

 i) +
X
j 6=i
aji;vj(i; 

 i); (35)
where aji; is the weight player i gives to player j's monetary utility depend-
ing on the entire strategy prole . The model nests most outcome-based
models and can account for reciprocity based on actions. Without restric-
tions on (35), behavior may appear irrational or o-equilibrium to outside
observers who only know players' preferences over payos. The set of poten-
tial Nash equilibria in the model is rather large, ruling out only dominated
strategies.29
2.6 Other Models
Not all models are (solely) based on outcomes or reciprocity. The theories in
this section add factors like social norms, social identity, self-image, or emo-
27For an axiomatic analysis of the Fehr-Schmidt model, see Neilson (2006).
28Unlike in psychological game theory, there are no higher-order beliefs in the context
.
29For example, in 2x2 games with four dierent outcomes, all four pure strategy pairs
can be Nash-equilibria even though in the standard theory, there could be at most two
Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
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tions to the utility function, although outcomes naturally remain pivotal. By
including economically intangible variables like social identity, some of these
models borrow strongly from psychological and sociological concepts while
at the same time, they remain rmly rooted in the rationality framework.
Many of these hybrid models are relatively isolated approaches outside the
main academic discourse and therefore have not undergone much progres-
sion (yet). Whether they constitute groundbreaking ideas pulling down dis-
ciplinary walls or ill-fated interdisciplinary potpourris, neither sh nor fowl,
still remains to be seen.
Largely independent of the contemporary ultimatum game and dictator
game literature, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) develop a model around social
identity, i.e., a person's sense of self. They assume that following the be-
havioral descriptions of the own social category arms self-image, whereas
violations evoke anxiety and discomfort, so that self-identity changes payos
from dierent actions. In the model, there are sets of social categories C
and prescriptions P which indicate appropriate behavior, physical charac-
teristics, and other attributes of people belonging to the categories. Each
person i assigns a social category out of C to all people, including herself.
This mapping is denoted ci.
30 They propose the utility function
Ui = Ui(ai; a i; Ii); (36)
where Ii is person i's identity, ai is the vector of i's actions and a i the
actions of all other individuals. Person i's identity is represented by Ii =
Ii(ai; a i; ci; i; P ), where i are i's characteristics. Person i will then choose
the action ai that maximizes her utility taking a i, ci, i, and P as given.
Akerlof and Kranton then use this framework to discuss various identity-
related behaviors like gender specic job choice, donations to one's alma
mater, or advertising. In two separate papers, they extend the discussion
to education (Akerlof and Kranton 2002) and contract theory (Akerlof and
Kranton 2005).
In an approach that is more closely related to purely outcome-based mod-
els, Cox et al. (2007) introduce an emotional state  into a CES utility
function. The emotional state inuences the marginal rate of substitution
30The category person i assigns to person j is not necessarily the same that person j
assigns to himself.
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between own and other's payo.
Ui =
(
(xi + x

j )=;  2 ( 1; 0) [ (0; 1];
xix

j ;  = 0;
(37)
with  indicating convexity. The marginal rate of substitution is @Ui=@xi
@Ui=@xj
=
 1

xj
xi
1 
, so the willingness to pay for increasing the other's payo is 1
MRS
if xi = xj. The emotional state  depends on the reciprocity variable r and
the status variable s. The reciprocity variable r is the dierence between
the maximum payo i can secure for himself after j's earlier choice and the
payo i would get in a \neutral" situation. The status variable s represents
relative status (other than relative payo), i.e., asymmetries in individuals'
entitlements or obligations, e.g. due to age, job title, or exerted eort. The
model can account for a relatively wide spectrum of phenomena, e.g. both
eciency concerns (if  > 0) and ultimatum game rejections (if f r < 0 leads
to negative  < 0) can be explained by it.
A very specialized model originates from an experiment using a variant
of the trust game. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) compare subjects' be-
liefs and behavior with and without prior communication between investor
and trustee. They observe that communication increases both the investor's
beliefs in the trustee's trustworthiness and the likelihood that the trustee be-
haves trustworthily, prompting Charness and Dufwenberg to conclude that
trustees are guilt averse, i.e., they try to not let others down (Baumeister
et al. 1994).31 Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) formalize guilt aversion in
extensive-form games with the help of psychological game theory. In their
setting, T denotes the set of nodes with Z  T the set of endnotes. Hi is
player i's information structure, which is a partition of T . The pure strategy
si contains all choices of player i for each h 2 Hi. Player i has rst-order
beliefs i about the other players' strategies, second-order beliefs i about
other players' rst-order beliefs, third-order beliefs i about other players'
second-order beliefs and so on. All beliefs are Bayesian. Given sj and j
at the initial information set h0, player j has an expected material payo
Esj ;j. The dierence between this expected material payo and actual ma-
terial payo at z is denoted Dj(z; sj; j) and measures how much player j
31There is some evidence that people actually just have a preference for keeping their
promises, but do not care much about disappointing others' beliefs (Vanberg 2008).
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feels \let down". Finally, Gij(z; s i; j) measures how much of Dj is player
i's responsibility given s i, j, and z.
Within this framework, Battigalli and Dufwenberg propose two concepts
of guilt. First, they assume player i experiences simple guilt when letting
down player j, so i maximizes the expected value of the following utility
function
USGi = xi(z) 
X
j 6=i
ijGij(z; s i; j); (38)
where ij  0 is player i's guilt sensitivity. Second, they assume player i
dislikes being blamed by others for letting them down. Given si and initial
beliefs 0i and 
0
i , i derives G
0
ij(si; 
0
i ; 
0
i ) which measures how much he ex-
pects to let j down ex-ante. At z, Ej ;j ;j[G
0
ijjHj(z)] is j's inference about
how much i intentionally let j down. Disliking guilt from blame, player i's
utility is given by
UGBi = xi(z) 
X
j 6=i
ijEj ;j ;j[G
0
ijjHj(z)]: (39)
In two-player games with simultaneous moves and without chance, both con-
cepts yield the same equilibria, but in other games, they may not.
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) look at the dictator game from a novel
perspective, assuming that people care about fairness to a certain degree,
but also like to be perceived as fair. Concretely, dictators care about their
own payo xi, their social image m as perceived by some audience A, and
the dierence between the receiver's payo xj and the fair payo x
F which
they assume is 50% when both players are equally meritorious. Dictator i's
utility function is given by
Ui = F (xi;m) + tG(xj   xF ); (40)
with t the weight on fairness. F (xi;m) is unbounded, strictly increasing,
and concave in xi. G(xj   xF ) is strictly concave and reaches its maximum
at 0. Both functions are twice continuously dierentiable. The distribution
of t in the population is atomless with full support between 0 and t and is
private information. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of t is H.
Social image m is normalized such that if A perceives i to put weight bt on
fairness, m is bt.  is the CDF representing A's beliefs about bt and B()
is the corresponding social image. For example, B() may be the mean
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t given . Hence, the dictator signals t to A through the transfer xj. In
equilibrium, i chooses the optimal transfer xj such that given the mappings
of types t to transfers xj and transfers xj to beliefs , the transfer maximizes
the dictator's utility.
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) show that if the population contains suf-
ciently fair-minded players, there exists a pool at the equal split.32 This is
consistent with experimental evidence from dictator games where transfers
typically exhibit a spike at 50% of the pie, but are non-existing slightly below
50%.
Both aversion of guilt from blame (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007) and
Andreoni and Bernheim's model oer possible explanations for why people
tend to behave more selshly when their actions are not clearly attributable
as several experiments have shown (e.g. Kagel et al. 1996; Guth et al. 1996;
Dana et al. 2006, 2007). A player may want to \hide" behind outcomes that
may also be due to chance, i.e., she implements an outcome that does not
allow observers to attribute the result to her actions with certainty. This
way, the player can avoid negative inferences about her behavior while se-
curing a higher material payo than she would have implemented under full
supervision in order to avoid blame or to appear fair.
The last model in this section is based on social norms. Lopez-Perez
(2008) argues that people have internalized fairness or distributive justice
norms and that their emotional reactions to violations of these norms compel
them to certain behavior. He denes a norm  as a correspondence  : h!
A(h), i.e., for any information set h of the game, action a 2 A(h) is consistent
with the norm  if a 2  (h). Principled players endure a cost when violating
a norm they have internalized. These costs depend inversely on the number
of transgressors, so violating the norm is less costly when many players do
so. A principled player's utility at node z is given by
Ui =
(
xi(z) if i 2 R(z);
xi(z)    r(z) if i =2 R(z);
(41)
where  > 0 measures how intensely the player has internalized the norm,
32This result is primarily due to the violation of the single-crossing property of the
dictator's preferences over fairness and social image. If t1 > t2, player 1 incurs lower
costs than player 2 when raising his transfer if the transfer is below 50%. However, if the
transfer is above 50%, he incurs higher costs. Hence, player 1's willingness to increase
the transfer to improve his social image drops sharply at 50%, which therefore becomes a
\natural boundary" for transfers.
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R(z) is the set of players who have respected the norm and r(z) the number of
players in R(z). Lopez-Perez applies the model using a eciency and equity
norm and a honesty and fairness norm (Lopez-Perez 2012) and emphasizes
that his model can explain various socials norms including dressing norms,
codes of etiquette, etc. However, although the model can ex-post explain
observed behavior by postulating a corresponding norm, it says very little
about how a norm is chosen and therefore has diculties predicting behavior
in unprecedented situations.
2.7 The Case Against
Most people would probably not nd it presumptuous to say that social pref-
erence models have established themselves in mainstream economics. Various
journals publish theoretical or empirical papers on the topic and the number
of researchers involved in such studies has grown tremendously over the last
decades. To young researchers, it may seem inconceivable that not too long
ago, many economists vehemently rejected the idea of interrelated utility and
truly believed that \when self-interest and ethical values [...] are in conict,
much of the time, most of the time in fact, self-interest theory [...] will win"
(Stigler 1980).
Accordingly, the prevalent early response to the ultimatum game puzzles
was to explain them with bounded rationality. Because people do not engage
in backward induction (Binmore 1987; Binmore et al. 1988) { so the argu-
ment goes { they rst need to learn how to behave. Since the rejection of
low oers is more costly for proposers than for responders, proposers learn
more quickly to make higher oers than responders learn to accept low oers
(Roth and Erev 1995; Gale et al. 1995). Players therefore arrive at a Nash-
equilibrium that is not sub-game perfect. Eventually, however, the argument
does not hold up too well. In the ultimatum game, recipients are faced with
such a simple decision (that does not require backward induction) that it is
inconceivable that they make mistakes contradicting their true preferences.
Furthermore, it seems that in very simple two-stage games, players are gen-
erally able to predict others' behavior quite well (Suleiman 1996; Fehr et al.
1998). With the emergence of the even simpler dictator game, the argument
eventually faded away.
A related argument claims that when subjects in the laboratory are con-
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fronted with an unfamiliar situation, they resort to general social norms to
make their decisions.33 However, these norms supposedly evolved in an en-
vironment of repeated interaction and are therefore ill-adapted for one-shot
interactions like the ultimatum game (Binmore and Samuelson 1994; Binmore
1988). For example, a fairness norm may have evolved \as an ecient so-
lution to the equilibrium selection problem" (Binmore and Samuelson 1999)
which also requires a punishment mechanism to sustain it. That is why play-
ers \who are oered unfairly small amounts [...] feel resentful and [...] want
to punish the proposer by refusing" (ibid.). However, following this argu-
ment, it becomes dicult to maintain that the rejection of an unfair oer
constitutes something else than a revealed social preference. If players choose
rejection when acceptance is available, then the mutual rejection payo of
zero is directly revealed preferred to the unfair oer. Labeling such behav-
ior an error calls fundamental economic principles into question. The fact
that such behavior is not an evolutionary stable strategy in an environment of
anonymous ultimatum game interactions is irrelevant. Furthermore, subjects
typically seem to be aware of the dierences between one-shot and repeated
interactions (e.g. Andreoni and Miller 1993; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) and
decrease their demand for fairness as it becomes more expensive (Andreoni
and Vesterlund 2001), suggesting that they treat fairness as a normal good.
Most other objections against the assumption of social preferences have
also eventually been refuted, including, for example, low stake size (Homan
et al. 1996; Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999) or the representativ-
ity of student subjects (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Bellemare and Kroger
2003). Even Binmore and Shaked (2010) \acknowledge that the accumu-
lation of experimental evidence can be regarded as an informal proof that
such preferences exist". However, critics continue to raise methodological
concerns. Primarily, Binmore and Shaked (2010) criticize that experimental
and behavioral economists usually explain deviations from standard theory
ex-post by modifying the self-interested model, but fail both to properly de-
ne their theory's domain of application and to make testable predictions.
In particular, they focus their criticism on the inequality model by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) as an example, reproaching them for inadequately estimating
the distribution of their  and  parameters, failing to make out-of-sample
prediction, and selectively reporting experimental results that t their model
33Elster (1989) oers a neutral perspective on the relationship of social norms and
economic theory.
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(also Shaked 2005). Fehr and Schmidt (2005, 2010) rmly reject the criti-
cism, stating that \a model of social behavior is always an idealization that
focuses on some forces aecting individual behavior and abstracts from many
others. Whether a particular model is a good one depends on the situation
under consideration and on the question that is being addressed." In this
they have also received support from Eckel and Gintis (2010).
A dierent line of argument { again primarily aimed at inequality aver-
sion { concerns the explanatory power of social preference models. For ex-
ample, Bergh (2008) argues that outcome-based models are too simplistic
compared to distributive justice theories from political philosophy, that they
ignore aspects like procedural concerns or property rights, and { most im-
portantly { that they fail to explain why people exhibit certain preferences
in the rst place. Similar criticism comes from Berg and Gigerenzer (2010),
who generally object to as-if behavioral economics as neoclassical economics
in disguise. Specically, they criticize that social preference models take an
unrealistic assumption { utility maximization { and make it even more com-
plicated by adding more parameters to the utility function, ignoring all psy-
chological insight on decision making. However, such arguments typically go
unheeded among most economists. Following Friedman (1953), even behav-
ioral economists primarily care about the quality of their models' predictions,
but not necessarily about how well it represents psychological insights.
2.8 Concluding Remarks: Where Do We Stand and
Where to Next?
Would the right social preference model please stand up! As this title of an ar-
ticle by Daruvala (2010) suggests, there is still no consensus among behavioral
economists about the precise nature of people's social preferences. On the
one hand, the relative importance of intentionality and outcomes is still un-
der discussion (Sutter 2007; Falk et al. 2008). On the other hand, even within
the outcome-based approach, the controversy between advocates of inequity
aversion and welfare concerns continues, too (Daruvala 2010; Blanco et al.
2011; Graf et al. 2012). Given that social preferences appear to be decidedly
heterogeneous among individuals (Andreoni and Miller 2002; Fisman et al.
2007; Blanco et al. 2011) and contexts (Kahneman et al. 1986; Loewenstein
et al. 1989; Eckel and Grossman 1996a), it is unlikely that a conclusive con-
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sensus in favor of a single model will ever be reached. In the meantime,
more and more models have entered the stage. After a period in which the
main approaches underwent continuous development { arguably culminating
in the unifying model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) { the recent past has
seen several models going beyond outcomes and reciprocity (e.g. Battigalli
and Dufwenberg 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). So instead of moving
toward a consensus or at least toward any form of universal framework, the
eld appears to drift more and more apart, leaving behind a patchwork of
various, sometimes completely isolated, approaches.
However, among the plethora of available models, the theories of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Ra-
bin (2002) continue to dominate the economic analysis of social preferences
even more than a decade after their publication (see e.g. chapter 3 and 4).
It appears that these three models possess characteristics that make them
particularly \useful" for economists. Compared to other models, they dis-
tinguish themselves by \simplicity" and \fruitfulness"; all three are among
the most traceable models available, allowing straightforward qualitative pre-
dictions and requiring only the knowledge of two free parameters to make
quantitative predictions.34 In addition, their universality gives them a wide
domain of application which extends way past the basic experimental games.
Other models either have more free parameters, are less traceable, or apply
to a narrower domain. However, it is not true that all other models lead an
unheeded niche existence. For example, Rabin's intention-based reciprocity
model and its successors are dicult to trace because they require infor-
mation about beliefs (among other things), but they allow straightforward
qualitative predictions in many dierent situations. However, some models
have such a specic domain of application that their primary value clearly
does not lie in their applicability. Instead, they mainly constitute formaliza-
tions of concepts rather than tools for data analysis.
This leads to the question which development the research on social pref-
erence models will (or should) take in the future. A possible direction is
to continue the trend toward more and more specic models with relatively
narrow domains of application. Given that the list of factors known to inu-
ence behavior in social games already includes items such as age (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2002; Bellemare and Kroger 2003), gender (Eckel and Grossman
34The ERC-model has no specic functional form, but the exemplary function requires
has two free parameters.
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1996b; Croson and Buchan 1999; Dufwenberg and Muren 2006), social rela-
tionship (Burnham et al. 2000; Leider et al. 2009), social distance (Homan
et al. 1996; Branas-Garza et al. 2010), personality traits (Brandstatter and
Konigstein 2001; Schmitt et al. 2008), procedural fairness (Bolton and Ock-
enfels 2006), communication (Brosig et al. 2003; Fiedler and Haruvy 2009;
Balliet 2009), status (Ball et al. 2001), entitlement (Homan et al. 1996;
Cherry et al. 2002; Bosman et al. 2005), verbal punishment opportunities
(Xiao and Houser 2005), eort (Fong 2001), institutional environment (Frey
and Bohnet 1995; Elliott et al. 1998; Ostrom 2000), peer eects (Cason and
Mui 1998), expressed expectations (Charness and Rabin 2005), persuasion
(Andersson et al. 2010), promises (Vanberg 2008), culture (Roth et al. 1991;
Buchan et al. 2004; Henrich et al. 2005, 2010), and so on, there appears
to be no shortage of starting points for further work.35 A second possible
direction is toward a universal model of social preferences that unies the
three elements inequity aversion, welfare concerns, and reciprocity in a sin-
gle framework and { ideally { is also able to accommodate aspects of other
models. While attempts at such a unifying theory have been undertaken,
none has been widely recognized as successful so far (Engelmann 2012).
To those who focus on applications and predictions, the latter way is
preferable in principal.36 However, to quote Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953), \such fortunate occurrences are rare and happen only after each eld
has been thoroughly explored". And therein lies the potential of the rst
way. Formalizing behavioral patterns claries concepts and allows predictions
to be made for experimental testing to resolve unanswered question. This
approach may not create impact theories like the seminal papers did, but it
may serve as an important intermediate step toward a deeper understanding
of human behavior. Therefore, as long as modication is not an end in
itself, it is misguided to accuse those who add new components to the utility
function of working in a \neo-classical repair shop" (Guth 1995). Even if, as
Binmore and Samuelson (1999) argue, social preference models only do well
as descriptions of behavioral patterns, but do not explain why individuals
develop certain preferences in a certain situation, it does not mean they are
a priori useless. The more systematic behavioral patterns are brought to light
35A particular area that still appears to be under-represented in models are preferences
toward (inactive) third parties where existing models do not predict behavior well (e.g.
Kagel and Wolfe 2001; Bereby-Meyer and Niederle 2005).
36Assuming, of course, that a unication is indeed attainable, which we will not know
until somebody actually accomplishes the task.
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and described formally, the likelier an eventual unifying theory will indeed
be universal. Therefore, as Eckel and Gintis (2010) put it, \economists need
more, not fewer, speculative and creative models of human behavior".
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3 A Closer Look at Inequity Aversion and
Incentives in Tournaments
3.1 Introduction
In their seminal article, Lazear and Rosen (1981) showed that tournaments
are eective incentive mechanisms in various settings. Their major advantage
is that only ordinal information on agents' performances is needed, reducing
the principal's need for costly monitoring. At the same time, they allow cred-
ible commitment to a xed prize structure even when performance signals
are unveriable by third parties. Furthermore, tournaments reduce the im-
pact of common shocks in productivity, so agents do not need to be insured
against them.
However, tournaments inevitably create inequality, something people usu-
ally dislike (Loewenstein et al. 1989). If agents have social preferences as
modeled by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999), they
suer from disadvantageous inequality (having less than others) as well as
from advantageous inequality (having more than others). This consequently
results in tournaments being less attractive for inequity averse agents than
for agents without social preferences. This has been systematically demon-
strated by Grund and Sliwka (2005). Using the model of Fehr and Schmidt
(FS), who assume that disadvantageous inequality is worse for agents than
advantageous inequality, they show that implemented eort levels are lower
for inequity averse agents compared to purely self-regarding ones when the
principal chooses winner prize and loser prize endogenously.
If, however, prizes for winning and losing the tournament are exogenously
given, advantageous and disadvantageous inequality have diametrical eects
on incentives. On the one hand, disutility from advantageous inequality de-
creases incentives to win the tournament, but on the other hand, disutility
from disadvantageous inequality increases incentives to avoid losing the tour-
nament. Grund and Sliwka nd that the overall incentive eect is positive,
leading to higher eorts by inequity averse agents compared to the standard
model in tournaments with two agents.
In this paper, we employ the ERC-model of Bolton and Ockenfels to re-
view the results of Grund and Sliwka and to examine to what extend those
depend on the assumptions of the FS-model. While the main nding that
the principal's payo is reduced when agents are inequity averse persists, the
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incentive eect of inequity aversion vanishes in the ERC-model. Addition-
ally, we extend the model to tournaments with any number of participants
and winners. While we do not nd any incentive eects of the tournament
structure for standard agents, both types of inequity averse agents display a
general tendency to prefer being in the majority group where they suer less
from the tournament's inequality. The principal can use this eect to her
advantage by designing tournaments with many winners, although she can
never reach her rst best payo. Conversely, if tournaments have very few
winners and many losers, incentives may be distorted to such a degree that
agents are better o losing the tournament and do not exert any eort at all.
This paper contributes to the analysis of tournament incentives estab-
lished by Lazear and Rosen (1981). In particular, it adds to a strand of
literature assuming that tournament participants are not exclusively moti-
vated by their monetary payo. Building on an idea introduced by Stark
(1987, 1990), Krakel (2000) was the rst to formally introduce a form of
social utility to an agent's utility function in a tournament setting. In his
model, agents are trying to avoid relative deprivation. The concept is re-
lated to disadvantageous inequality insofar as agents dislike receiving a lower
income than their reference group. Krakel shows that agents who dislike
relative deprivation exert more eort than agents in the standard model. In-
dependent of Grund and Sliwka, Demougin and Fluet (2003) also examine
tournament incentives under FS-inequity aversion, although in their model,
they assume limited liability and the principal can costly improve perfor-
mance assessment. They nd that the principal prefers more envious agents
when monitoring costs are higher. Another related study has been done by
Krakel (2008), where agents in a tournament compare not their monetary
outcome, but their performance, experiencing positive or negative emotions
when outperforming or falling behind their rival.
The paper is also related to the study of multi-agent tournaments. Like
tournaments with two agents, multi-agent tournaments are formally equiva-
lent to piece-rate contracts as Malcomson (1986) shows. Ferrall (1996) uses a
multi-agent tournament model to estimate the signicance of promotions in
law rms, but does little else than conrm a general incentive eect. Krakel
(2000) nds that in multi-agent tournaments with either a single winner
prize or a single loser prize, the incentive eect of relative deprivation be-
comes stronger with a single loser prize and weaker with a single winner prize.
Kalra and Shi (2001) theoretically analyze sales contests and conclude that
the optimal design has a single winner if agents are risk-neutral, but more
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than one winner if agents are risk-averse. Lim et al. (2009) conrm these
predictions with laboratory data and eld data. Orrison et al. (2004) look at
multi-agent tournaments both theoretically and experimentally. They nd
that although the theory predicts no dierences, subjects tend to decrease
their eort when there are more winner prizes than loser prizes and subjects
exert the highest eort when the numbers of winners and losers are equal.
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) get similar experimental results in a tourna-
ment setting with sabotage. However, neither Orrison et al. nor Harbring
and Irlenbusch nd systematic dierences of the total number of agents. Chen
et al. (2011) consider multi-agent tournaments with asymmetric contestants
who receive dierent initial endowments. In their experiment, both advan-
taged and disadvantaged agents exert more eort than the standard theory
predicts. Similar to Krakel (2008), Chen et al. extend the standard model so
that favorites experience additional negative utility from losing whereas un-
derdogs experience additional positive utility from winning, which provides
an explanation for their experimental results.
The analysis of fairness concerns in the work environment is a highly
relevant topic. Survey studies by Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell III
and Kamlani (1997), and Agell and Lundborg (2003) show that co-workers
in rms usually have strong equity concerns, which constitutes one cause
for downwards wage rigidity. Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2008), and En-
glmaier and Wambach (2010) examine optimal contracts under moral hazard
when agents are inequity averse toward the principal, whereas Neilson and
Stowe (2010), Goukasian and Wan (2010), and Bartling and von Siemens
(2010) derive optimal contracts when agents compare themselves to each
other. Rey-Biel (2008) considers models of team incentives and Demougin et
al. (2006) examine a two-task environment. Desiraju and Sappington (2007)
introduce inequity aversion into the adverse selection model and Goel and
Thakor (2006) and Bartling (2011) extend the analysis to other-regarding
agents with risk-aversion. Finally, Kolle et al. (2011) investigate how in-
equality aversion changes contributions to public goods. Experimental stud-
ies are headlined by Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), who examine bonus and
trust contracts under moral hazard both experimentally and theoretically.
Cabrales et al. (2007) study contract and eort decisions between principals
and teams of agents in a market experiment. Furthermore, Mohnen et al.
(2008) explain peer pressure in teams with inequity aversion and conrm
their ndings in a real-eort experiment.
Virtually all of the theoretical studies of inequity aversion employ the
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FS-model or closely related concepts for their analysis. The ERC-model,
on the other hand, is hardly ever used in principal-agent-models. This lack
of comparative studies is very unfortunate because both models do not just
take a dierent mathematical form, they represent two dierent concepts of
social comparison. In the FS-model, an individual compares his own outcome
to the outcome of each other individual separately, experiencing envy or
compassion to every single one of them. In the ERC-model, an individual
is just concerned with how his own outcome compares to a social reference
point and does not care about the individual outcomes of others. When
only two agents interact, both approaches overlap to a certain degree. Yet
in scenarios with many agents, both models may dier signicantly in their
predictions. Even in two-person-settings, however, a comparison of both
models can be worthwhile. Not only does the ERC-model not explicitly
distinguish between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality like the
FS-model does, the ERC-model's very general form contrasts the linearity of
the FS-model, which makes the latter mathematically easier to manage, but
also more prone to corner solutions. If nothing else, employing both models
serves as a general robustness check which may lead to new (experimental)
research questions when both models make dierent predictions.
3.2 Two-Agent Tournaments and Inequity Aversion
3.2.1 The Model of Grund and Sliwka
Grund and Sliwka use a single-round tournament in which two agents com-
pete for one prize (e.g. a promotion or a bonus) given to the agent producing
the higher output. Each agent i's output is given by his production function
qi = h(ei) + "i, where ei is the agent's eort, h(ei) a concave function, and
"i a random component which is independent and identically distributed for
both agents. The costs of eort are C(ei) with C
0(ei) > 0 and C 00(ei) > 0.
The prizes for the winner and the loser of the tournament are w1 and w2,
respectively, with w1 > w2 and w = w1   w2: Negative wages are allowed
and a limited liability assumption is not imposed.
The agents have social preferences as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). Therefore, agent i's utility from his tournament prize wi is given by
ui = wi    maxfwj   wi; 0g    maxfwi   wj; 0g   C(ei); (42)
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where wi and wj are the agents' wages.
37 According to the assumptions
made by Fehr and Schmidt,   0,   0, and  > , so agents suer
from inequality and disadvantageous inequality is worse than advantageous
inequality. Furthermore, the model assumes  < 1, i.e., an agent always
prefers receiving more money if the other agent's payo is held constant.
The utility of the tournament winner is therefore given by
uWi = w1   w   C(ei) = w2 + (1  )w   C(ei) (43)
and the utility of the loser by
uLi = w2   w   C(ei): (44)
Agents are assumed to evaluate lotteries by comparing expected utility. With
G() the distribution function of the random variable "i   "j and g() its
density function, agent i's winning probability is
1 G(h(ej)  h(ei)) = G(h(ei)  h(ej)) (45)
and his expected utility is given by
EUi =G(h(ei)  h(ej))[w1   w   C(ei)]
+ (1 G(h(ei)  h(ej))[w2   w   C(ei)]
=w2   w +G(h(ei)  h(ej))[w(1   + )]  C(ei):
(46)
Symmetric agents choose identical eorts in equilibrium.38 This equilibrium
eort is characterized by
w(1   + )g(0) = C
0(e)
h0(e)
(47)
and it increases in the prize spread w as well as in the strength of envy
, but decreases in the strength of compassion . From the assumption
 >  follows that (1    + ) is always greater than 1. Therefore, for any
given prize structure, inequity averse agents exert higher eort than purely
self-regarding agents with  =  = 0.
37It is assumed that the agents' utility is not aected by the principal's payo because
she does not belong to the agents' reference group.
38For a discussion about when such an equilibrium exists, see section 3.3.1.
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However, Grund and Sliwka go on to show that despite this incentive
eect, the principal is actually worse o with inequity averse agents when
participation is voluntary and the principal can freely set the tournament's
prizes to extract all surplus from the agents. The reason is that inequity
averse agents need to be compensated for their inequity costs with a higher
loser prize in order to be willing to participate in the tournament. The
principal therefore reduces the price spread and implements lower eort levels
compared to the rst best solution.
3.2.2 The ERC-Model and Tournaments with Two Agents
The Model: The ERC-Model (Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition) by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is an alternative model of social preferences.
According to the ERC-model, players are motivated only by their monetary
payo and their relative standing. Each agent i maximizes the expected
value of his motivation function vi = vi(yi; i), where yi is the agent's mon-
etary payo and i is his share yi=Y of the combined total payo Y of all
agents.39 The authors assume viyi(yi; i)  0, i.e., for any given relative pay-
o, agents prefer more money over less. Furthermore, vii(yi; 1=N) = 0 and
viii(yi; i) < 0, i.e., for any given monetary payo, the motivation function
is strictly concave in the relative payo with its maximum at the average
share. Finally, vi is assumed to be continuous and twice dierentiable on the
whole domain for mathematical convenience.
Bolton and Ockenfels do not stipulate a xed form for their motivation
function, so we employ a general utility function consistent with the ERC-
model. Agent i's utility is the sum of the monetary utility from his tour-
nament prize minus inequity costs.40 The agent's utility function is given
by
Ui = wi  W(&i); (48)
where W is the sum of the tournament's prizes (here w1 and w2) and (&i)
is the inequity cost function. The inequity costs depend on &, which is the
39If Y = 0, i = 1=N , where N is the number of players. However, Y = 0 cannot occur
in tournaments.
40Unlike this utility function, the original ERC-model also allows for preferences putting
zero weight on the monetary payo. Such agents, however, would never voluntarily par-
ticipate in a tournament since they do not care about their tournament prize, but suer
inequity costs for sure.
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dierence of the received share i and the equal share 1=2, i.e., &i = i  1=2.
(&i) is a twice dierentiable function with its minimum at (0) = 0 and
00(&i) > 0. From &i = wi2w2+w   12 follows w(&i) > 0 (if w2 > 0) and
w2(&i) < 0, i.e., inequity costs increase in the prize spread and decrease in
the loser prize. Furthermore, we assume  (x) =  ( x), i.e., inequity costs
are equal for winner and loser of the tournament. Bolton and Ockenfels
do not explicitly make this assumption, although in their article, they oer
an exemplication for an ERC-utility function exhibiting this property (see
(49)).
Additionally, by multiplying (&i) with W , we obtain another useful
characteristic of the inequity costs. If w2+w
w2
= v2+v
v2
and w2 > v2, then
(&w) = (&v), but W(&w) > V (&v) with V = 2v2 + v. This means that
for a given ratio of winner to loser prize, inequity costs increase in the sum
of both prizes, but the ratio of inequity costs to the prizes remains constant.
The reason for this assumption may not be immediately clear. However,
consider an ultimatum game and assume a player would reject an oer of
2j8. This means that his inequity costs from a 20% share are higher than
the monetary utility of 2. Lets say the inequity costs are 3. If inequity costs
only depended on the share, but did not increase in total payo, the same
player would accept an oer of 4j16 because his inequity costs would still be
3 since he still receives 20% of the pie. Under the new assumption, however,
the player's inequity costs would increase to 6 (3=10 = 6=20). Therefore, the
assumption assures that if a player rejects an allocation with a given share
in the ultimatum game, he will reject every other allocation with the same
share, too. Bolton and Ockenfels do not explicitly make this assumption
because they only consider games with xed total payos and can always
normalize the total payo to 1, which is not possible here. We therefore
strongly believe that the additional assumption is very much in the spirit of
the ERC-model.
As mentioned above, Bolton and Ockenfels give an exemplary ERC-utility
function in their article:
Ui(i; Y; i) = aiY   b
2

i   1
2
2
(49)
A player's type is characterized by a=b (a  0, b  0). Players with a=b = 0
are strictly relativistic while those with a=b =1 display narrow self-interest.
The former type would give half of the endowment in the dictator game and
reject any oer lower than half in the ultimatum game while the latter would
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behave according to standard economic theory in both games, keeping the
whole endowment in the dictator game and accepting any positive oer in
the ultimatum game. With the total payo Y normalized to 1, players keep
(0:5+a=b) in the dictator game and reject any oer lower than 0:5 
p
ab+a2 a
b
(see A.1.1).
Adjusting (49) to our setting and xing a = 1 yields
Ui(wi;W ) =wi  W b
2

wi
w2 + w1
  1
2
2
=wi   (2w2 +w) b
2

w2
2w2 +w
  1
2
2
=wi   b(w)
2
8(2w2 +w)
;
(50)
which exhibits all characteristics of the general ERC-utility function.
Tournament Incentives: An agent i with ERC-preferences receives the
following utility from his prize wi in the tournament:
Ui = wi  W(&i) = wi   k(w2;w): (51)
The inequity costs W(&i) depend only on the loser prize w2 and the prize
spread w, but not on wi, hence we can expressW(&i) as k(w;w2) instead.
Accordingly, the utility of winning the tournament and the utility of losing
it are given by
UWi = w1   k(w2;w)  C(ei) (52)
and
ULi = w2   k(w2;w)  C(ei); (53)
respectively. Agent i's probability of winning the tournament is still given
by equation (45), therefore, agent i's expected utility is
EUi =G(h(ei)  h(ej))[w1   k(w2;w)]
+ (1 G(h(ei)  h(ej))[w2   k(w2;w)]  C(ei);
(54)
which can be simplied to
EUi = w2   k(w2;w) +G(h(ei)  h(ej))w   C(ei): (55)
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Maximizing expected utility with respect to eort yields the rst order con-
dition
g(h(ei)  h(ej)) h0(ei) w   C 0(ei) = 0; (56)
which is equal to the standard result for purely self-regarding agents. Since
inequity costs do not depend on the success in the tournament, they do not
inuence the eort decision of the agents.
Proposition 1: For any given prize spread in two-agent-tournaments,
agents with ERC-preferences choose the same equilibrium eort level as agents
with standard preferences. The optimal eort level e is characterized by
w g(0) =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
: (57)
The equilibrium eort is increasing in the prize spread w, but is indepen-
dent of the degree of the agent's inequity aversion.
This result stands in contrast to Grund and Sliwka's proposition that
for any given prize spread, inequity averse agents exert more eort than
purely self-regarding agents. The dierence is driven by the assumption of
Fehr and Schmidt's model that disadvantageous inequality looms larger than
advantageous inequality.
Corollary 1: If the prize structure is xed, the principal's prot is inde-
pendent of the degree of inequity aversion of agents with ERC-preferences. A
tournament between two such agents leads to the same prots as one between
two purely self-regarding agents.
The Optimal Prize Structure: When the principal can design the tour-
nament's prize structure, she maximizes her payo which consists of the
output produced by the agents minus the prizes she has to pay, i.e.,
UP = 2h(e)  w1   w2 = 2h(e)  2w2  w: (58)
With unlimited liability, the principal maximizes the total surplus and ex-
tracts all rents from the agents. However, the agents will only participate if
their expected utility from the tournament (55) is at least as high as their
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reservation utility U0. Following Grund and Sliwka, we assume that both
agents' reservation utility U0 is independent of their degree of inequity aver-
sion. The agents' participation constraint is therefore given by
w2 +
1
2
w   C(e)  k(w2;w)  U0: (59)
Increasing the prize spread w increases the monetary utility of the tourna-
ment, but also increases inequity costs. Since inequity costs are convex, for
small prize spreads, the appeal of the tournament increases when the prize
spread increases. At some point, however, inequity costs grow faster than
utility from money, i.e., kw(w;w2) >
1
2
, so increasing the prize spread
beyond this point decreases the appeal of the tournament. Grund and Sli-
wka encounter a similar issue. In their model, the participation constraint is
given by
w2 +
1
2
(1     )w   C(e)  U0: (60)
If + > 1, the utility from participating in the tournament strictly decrease
in the prize spread. The authors therefore assume  +  < 1 for all agents.
However, this assumption is a bit problematic as it suggests  < 0:5 even
though  = 0:5 is the threshold for positive transfers in the dictator game.
Using an ERC-utility function, at least some range of w > 0 exists where
the utility of participating in the tournament increases in the prize spread
w.
Assuming the parameters are such that the principal is indeed interested
in arranging the tournament, she maximizes her expected payo (58) while
taking into account the agents' incentive constraint (56) and participation
constraint (59). As the incentive constraint (56) shows, changing the loser
prize w2 does not change the agents' eort levels, so under unlimited liabil-
ity, the principal can always lower w2 to make the participation constraint
binding and extract all surplus. Therefore, the principal chooses the loser
prize
w2 = U0   1
2
w + C(e) + k(w2;w): (61)
Compared to the loser prize in the standard model with purely self-regarding
agents, which is given by
w2 = U0   1
2
w + C(e); (62)
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the loser prize of agents with ERC-preferences is always higher for any given
prize spread because the agents need to be compensated for their inequity
costs.
Proposition 2: For any given prize spread and reservation utility, agents
with ERC-preferences have to be paid a higher loser prize in order to partici-
pate in the tournament. The dierence in loser prizes is equal to the inequity
costs endured by the agents.
Inserting the loser prize (61) into the principal's payo (58) and expressing
e as a function of w yields
2h(e(w))  2C(e(w))  2k(w2;w)  2U0: (63)
Maximizing this expression yields the rst order condition
h0(e(w))  kw(w2;w)
e0(w)| {z }
>0
= C 0(e(w)): (64)
Compared to the rst order condition of the standard model given by
h0(e(w)) = C 0(e(w)); (65)
the optimal prize spread w and thereby the equilibrium eort level is lower
for agents with ERC-preferences.
Proposition 3: In two-agent-tournaments, the principal chooses a lower
prize spread for inequity averse agents with ERC-preferences, implementing
lower eort levels compared to the rst best solution with standard agents.
Solving the principal's maximization problem is decidedly less straight-
forward than in the standard model or in the model of Grund and Sliwka
because adjusting the prize spread changes the optimal loser prize and in
turn, adjusting the loser prize changes inequity costs, which requires adjust-
ing the prize spread and so on. For an approach to a solution and a numerical
example, see A.2.1 in the appendix.
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3.3 Multi-Agent-Tournaments
3.3.1 The Standard Model
Tournament Incentives: We look at a simple variant of the two-agent-
tournament discussed in section 3.2. First, we consider agents with standard
preferences (without inequity aversion) to establish benchmark results. A
number of agents N  2 competes for m  1 winner prizes w1, which are
given to the m agents producing the m highest outputs, i.e., agent i is among
the m winners if his output exceeds yN m:N 1, which is the N  m-th order
statistic of outputs produced by the other agents. For better readability, we
henceforth denote N  m as l and N   1 as n. Agent i's expected utility is
given by
Pww + w2   C(ei); (66)
where Pw is his probability to be among the m winners. To maximize his
expected utility, agent i will choose an eort level that satises
@Pw
@ei
= C 0(ei) (67)
and
@2Pw
@e2i
< C 00(ei): (68)
For N = 2, agent i's probability of winning depends on the dierence
of both agents' eort-depending output h(ej)   h(ei) and the dierence of
their realization of the random component "i   "j, i.e., Pw = P ("i   "j >
h(ej) h(ei)). If F (x) is the cumulative distribution function of " and f(x) its
density function, the density of the random variable "i "j is the convolution
(f   f)("i   "j) =
Z +1
 1
f(y)f(["i   "j] + y)dy ; (69)
where f  stands for f( x). Since "i and "j are identically distributed, (f  
f)("i  "j) = (f   f)("j   "i). Therefore, in order to maximize his expected
utility, agent i will choose an eort satisfying
(f   f)(h(ej)  h(ei))h0(ei)w   C 0(ei) = 0: (70)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, each agent's eort e in this case is characterized
by the following equation:
w
Z +1
 1
f(y)f(y)dy =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
; (71)
which is the original result from Lazear and Rosen (with the addition of
specifying the distribution of "i   "j). However, as Lazear and Rosen noted,
a symmetric equilibrium does not necessarily exist for all possible cumulative
distribution functions F (x). Such an equilibrium implies e1 = e2 = e
 and
(71) holding. Given that the left hand side is a positive constant and the right
hand side is 0 for e = 0 and increasing in eort, there exists a unique value e
satisfying (71). However, this value is not necessarily the best response given
the other agent chooses e because the reaction function may be discontinuous
in the relevant range so that (66) is not concave. Therefore, the symmetric
equilibrium only exists if the variance of the random variable is suciently
large.41
ForN > 2, agent i only cares about surpassing ql:n, the l-th highest output
of the other agents. All other outputs are irrelevant for his eort decision. If
" has limited support with lower bound "L 6=  1 and upper bound "U 6=1
and if no other agent has chosen an eort level within 2("U   "L) of the
l-th highest eort el:n, agent i's problem is reduced to the two-agent-case.
Otherwise, however, the problem gets signicantly more complicated because
the l-th highest output does not necessarily come from the agent choosing
the l-th highest eort. Agent i's winning probability Pw = P (qi > ql:n)
depends on the eort choices of all agents that (before the realization of the
random component) have a positive probability of producing ql:n and the
subsequent realization of their respective random components. We denote
the cumulative distribution function of ql:n as G^(), which is determined by
the vector of eort choices made by the other agents ej 6=i and "'s density
function f(x). The expression for agent i's expected utility is now
EUi = P (h(ei) > ql:n "i)w+w2 C(ei) = G^(h(ei))w+w2 C(ei); (72)
41For better intuition, consider a uniformly distributed random variable with a support
marginally greater than 0. There exists a unique e satisfying (71). However, if one agent
chooses e, the other agent may be better o exerting enough additional eort to ensure
100% winning probabily instead of also choosing e.
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and the rst order condition in turn becomes
(f   g^)(h(ei)) h0(ei)w   C 0(ei) = 0
,
Z +1
 1
f(y)g^(h(ei) + y)dyw =
C 0(ei)
h0(ei)
:
(73)
For the equilibrium analysis, we only consider the symmetric equilib-
rium in pure strategies. A symmetric equilibrium implies ei = e
 8 i andR +1
 1 f(y)g^(h(ei)+y)dyw =
C0(e)
h0(e) . Assuming the second order condition can
be met42, a symmetric equilibrium exists because each agent's eort choice
enters the objective function of the other agents through G^() via ej 6=i. So
in equilibrium, all agents face the same distribution G() and therefore have
identical objective functions. Mixed equilibria and asymmetric equilibria in
pure strategies may exists for certain distributions of the random variable,
but a general statement about existence or necessary conditions is virtually
impossible to make due to the complexity and possible range of G^().
If all other agents choose the equilibrium eort level e, each produces an
output of h(e) + ". Hence, agent i is among the tournament winners if his
output exceeds the sum h(e) + "l:n. The distribution function of the order
statistic "l:n is given by
F"l:n(x) =
nX
k=l

n
k

F (x)k [1  F (x)]n k (74)
or
F"l:n(x) = F"l 1:n(x) 

n
l   1

F (x)l 1 [1  F (x)]n l+1 : (75)
Using the latter, we derive the probability density function of "l:n:
f"l:n(x) =
n!
(l   1)!(n  l)!F (x)
l 1 [1  F (x)]n l f(x): (76)
Agent i's expected utility is now given by
EUi = P (h(ei)  h(e) > "l:n   "i)w + w2   C(ei); (77)
42As discussed above, for some distributions of the random variable, the second order
condition cannot be met.
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yielding the rst order condition
(f   f"l:n)(h(ei)  h(e)) h0(ei)w   C 0(ei) = 0
,
Z +1
 1
f(h(ei)  h(e) + y)
n!
(l   1)!(n  l)!F (y)
l 1 [1  F (y)]n l f(y)dyw = C
0(ei)
h0(ei)
:
(78)
In equilibrium, agent i chooses ei = e
 and (78) becomes
w
Z +1
 1
n!
(l   1)!(n  l)!F (y)
l 1 [1  F (y)]n l f(y)2dy = C
0(e)
h0(e)
: (79)
The integral is the marginal winning probability in equilibrium f"l:n(0).
Furthermore, if " is uniformly distributed on the interval (0; e"), (78) be-
comes
we" n!(l   1)!(n  l)!
Z e"
0
ye"l 1 h1  ye"in l dy = C 0(e)h0(e) : (80)
By substituting z = ye" , the integral becomes the beta integral43Z 1
0
zl 1 [1  z]n l dz =  (l) (n  l + 1)
 (l + n  l + 1) =
(l   1)!(n  l)!
n!
(81)
and the rst order condition simply becomes
we" = C 0(e)h0(e) : (82)
Hence, the equilibrium eort depends neither on the number of agents nor on
the number of winners in the tournament. Since every uniform distribution
can be made to correspond to any given interval by linear transformation,
this result generally holds for all uniform distributions U("L; "U). For other
distributions, however, this result typically does not hold.
43The beta integral (also called the Eulerian integral of the rst kind)
R 1
0
xp 1 (1  x)q 1
is equal to the beta function B(p; q) =  (p) (q) (p+q) . The  -function is the factorial function
with the argument decreased by 1, i.e.,  (p) = (p  1)!
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Proposition 4: In the symmetric equilibrium, purely self-regarding agents
in the multi-agent-tournament choose identical eort levels characterized by
f"l:n(0) w =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
; (83)
If the random component is uniformly distributed, the equilibrium eort does
not depend on the number of participants or on the number of winners, and
f"l:n(0) =
1
"U "L .
Intuitively, it may seem sensible to assume that with many (few) winners,
the base probability to win is high (low) so that the optimal eort level is
low (high).44 However, this intuition is not correct. The optimal eort choice
depends on the marginal winning probability f"l:n(0), not on the total winning
probability, because increasing the own eort level only changes the outcome
of an agent under one condition: He is not among the winners before the
increase, but the increase moves him past the \marginal winner", i.e., the
winner with the lowest output. Only the probability of this event is relevant
for eort choice.
In the symmetric equilibrium when all agents choose the eort level e,
the random variable of the marginal winner is "l:n (ignoring agent i). The
distribution of "l:n depends both on the number of agents and on the num-
ber of winners. For example, for a given number of agents, the skewness
of F"l:n becomes larger with each additional winner. For random variables
that are not uniformly distributed, this usually entails that the marginal
winning probability also depends on the number of agents and the number
of winners. However, this is not true for uniformly distributed random vari-
ables because their density is constant. For intuition, consider a normally
distributed random variable. For simplicity, we only look at the expected
value of the relevant order statistic, E("l:n), instead of its whole distribu-
tion. If the number of winners decreases (keeping N constant), the expected
value of the relevant order statistic increases (E("l+1:n) > E("l:n)). The
density of the random variable at both positions is usually dierent, i.e.,
f"("l+1:n) 6= f"("l:n). Therefore, the likelihood that a marginal increase in
eort changes the agent's winner status is also dierent. However, if " is uni-
formly distributed, the expected value of the order statistic still increases,
44The experimental results of Orrison et al. (2004) suggest that their subjects actually
followed this reasoning because subjects' eort levels decreased in the number of winners.
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yet the density of " remains the same. Hence the marginal winning proba-
bility does not change. Therefore, the number of agents and the number of
winners is irrelevant for the marginal winning probability in equilibrium if
the random variable is uniformly distributed.
Similar to the two-player case discussed above, the existence of the sym-
metric equilibrium is not guaranteed. Although a unique e exists, it is not
necessarily the best response to all other agents choosing e. As before, the
larger the variance of the random variable, the more likely an interior sym-
metric equilibrium exists. It is not possible to give general conditions which
are sucient for the existence because the relevant distribution functions can
take various forms.45.
The Optimal Prize Structure: The principal maximizes her payo UP =
Nh(e) Nw2  m w under the binding participation constraint
w2 +
m
N
w   C(e) = U0
,w2 = U0   m
N
w + C(e);
(84)
which gives us the maximization problem of the principal
max
e
Nh(e) NU0  NC(e): (85)
This yields the standard result of rst best eorts
h0(eFB) = C 0(eFB): (86)
Proposition 5: In multi-agent-tournaments, the principal chooses a
prize spread that induces rst best eorts dened by
h0(eFB) = C 0(eFB);
then chooses the loser prize to extract all surplus from the agents. Neither
the implemented eort level nor the principal's payo depends on the number
of winners in the tournament.
45Orrison et al. (2004) impose a functional form on both C(e) and h(e) and choose pa-
rameters to ensure the existence of an interior symmetric equilibrium in their experiment.
Yet even in their setting, it is possible to create a counterexample without symmetric
equilibrium by choosing a distribution with narrow support.
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Unlike Proposition 4, this result holds for all distributions of ". Since the
principal can always extract all rents from the agents via the loser prize, she
always implements the rst best eort level to maximize total surplus.46
3.3.2 The FS-Model in Multi-Agent-Tournaments
Tournament Incentives: In their article, Grund and Sliwka briey men-
tion that their ndings hold for tournaments with N agents as long as there
are at least N=2 winner prizes and no intermediate outcomes. In tournaments
with less than N=2 winners, they note, envy becomes weaker and eort lev-
els may drop below those of purely self-regarding agents. In any case, their
key result, that the principal is worse o with inequity averse agents, always
holds. The following section shows that those assertions are in fact correct.
Consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in a tournament withN agents,
m winners and prizes of w1 for the m winners and w2 for the N  m losers,
agent i's utility is given by
ui = wi   m
N   1  (w1   wi) 
N  m
N   1  (wi   w2)  C(ei): (87)
The extend of envy experienced by the loser(s) increases in the number of
winners but decreases in the number of total participants. Inversely, the
extend of compassion experienced by the winner(s) decreases in the number
of other winners and increases in the number of total participants (if there
are at least two winners). The original model is embedded for N = 2 and
m = 1. Agent i's expected utility is given by
EUi = G^(h(ei))

w1   N  m
N   1  (w1   w2)

+
1  G^(h(ei))

w2   m
N   1  (w1   w2)

  C(ei)
= w2   m
N   1 w
+ G^(h(ei))w(1  N  m
N   1  +
m
N   1 )  C(ei):
(88)
46Krakel (2000) nds a similar result. He shows that with endogeneous prizes, the
principal implements rst best eort levels for both standard workers and workers suering
from relative deprivation, irrespective of whether the winner prize is given to one agent or
to N   1 agents. However, note that proposition 5 depends on the agents' risk-neutrality.
With risk-averse agents, the principal will typically not implement rst-best eort levels
(Krakel 2008).
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The agent chooses his eort level to maximize his expected utility, which
yields the rst order condition
g^(h(ei))h
0(ei)w(1  N  m
N   1  +
m
N   1 )  C
0(ei) = 0 (89)
When all other agents choose the equilibrium eort e, these two expressions
become
EUi = F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))

w1   N  m
N   1  (w1   w2)

+
(1  F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e)))

w2   m
N   1  (w1   w2)

  C(ei)
= w2   m
N   1 w
+ F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))w(1 
N  m
N   1  +
m
N   1 )  C(ei):
(90)
and
f"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))h0(ei)w(1 
N  m
N   1  +
m
N   1 )  C
0(ei) = 0: (91)
In equilibrium, ei = e
 and f"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))h0(ei) = f"l:n(0).
Proposition 6: In equilibrium, all agents with FS-preferences choose
identical eort levels characterized by
w(1  N  m
N   1  +
m
N   1 )f"l:n(0) =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
: (92)
The equilibrium eort is increasing in the prize spread w and in the strength
of envy . It decreases in the strength of compassion . If " is uniformly
distributed, the equilibrium eort increases in the number of winners and de-
creases in the number of losers N m and f"l:n(0) = 1"U "L . For a given prize
spread, agents do not necessarily exert more eort than purely self-regarding
agents.
69
Corollary 2: If the prize structure is xed, the principal's prot is the
higher the stronger the agents' envy and the more agents win the tournament.
The principal's prot is the lower the stronger the agents' compassion and the
more participants are in the tournament. Compared to purely self-regarding
agents, a tournament with inequity averse agents does not necessarily lead to
a higher prot if there are more losers than winners.
Envy and compassion have the same eect on incentives as in two-agent-
tournaments. However, contrary to the original results, agents do not neces-
sarily exert higher eorts than purely self-regarding agents. Agents only do
so if the term in brackets is larger than 1, i.e., if the costs of envy toward
winners exceed the costs of compassion toward losers. Since  > , inequity
averse agents with FS-preferences will always exert more eort than purely
self-regarding agents if the winner prize is given to at least half of the partic-
ipants in the tournament (as indicated by Grund and Sliwka). Otherwise, if
the agents' degree of compassion  is large enough, i.e.,  > m
N m , inequity
averse agents actually exert less eort than standard agents. However, even
though compassion may outweigh envy in multi-agent-tournaments, the in-
centive eect of the prize spread can never become negative. Since  < 1, the
term in square brackets is always greater than zero and therefore a positive
eort level e exists that solves the incentive condition (92).
The Optimal Prize Structure: As usual, the principal chooses the over-
all prize structure that maximizes her payo under the participation con-
straint, which is given by
w2 +
m
N

1  N  m
N   1 ( + )

w   C(e)  U0: (93)
If we want to uphold Grund and Sliwka's condition that given the loser prize,
increasing the prize spread increases the overall appeal of the tournament,
their original assumption + < 1 can be relaxed to + < N 1
N m . Individual
inequity costs are lower in multi-agent-tournaments because when there are
more than two agents, there is a positive probability that after the conclusion
of the tournament, agent i will be in the same position (winner or loser) as
at least one other agent. Since that agent receives the same monetary payo,
agent i neither feels compassion nor envy toward him.
The principal can still make the participation constraint binding, so she
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chooses the loser prize
w2 = U0   m
N

1  N  m
N   1 ( + )

w + C(e): (94)
Inserting this loser prize into the principal's payo function yields the fol-
lowing maximization problem
max
e
Nh(e) NC(e) NU0   m(N  m)
N   1 ( + )w (95)
Solving the incentive constraint (92) for the prize spread w yields
w =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
 
1 + m
N 1   N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)
; (96)
which we can insert into the principal's payo function to obtain her maxi-
mization problem
max
e
Nh(e) NC(e) NU0 
m(N  m)
N   1 ( + )
C 0(e)
h0(e)
 
1 + m
N 1   N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)
:
(97)
This leads to the rst order condition
h0(e)  m(N  m)( + )(C
00(e)h0(e)  C 0(e)h00(e))
N
 
N   1)(1 + m
N 1  N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)(h
0(e))2| {z }
>0
= C 0(e): (98)
Proposition 7: Compared to the rst best solution h0(e) = C 0(e), the
principal chooses to implement a lower eort level when agents are inequity
averse with FS-preferences.
Making use of the envelope theorem, we obtain the partial derivatives of
(97) with respect to 
  n(N  m)(N   1 +N)
(N   1 +m  (N  m))2
m(N  m)C 0(e)
h0(e)f"l:n(0)
;
which is always negative. This is of course not surprising because a higher
degree of compassion not only decreases the agents' eort for a given prize
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spread, it also increases inequity costs for which the agents have to be com-
pensated with a higher loser prize. However, the eect is less straightforward
for envy. The partial derivative of (97) with respect to  is
1 +N(   1)
(N   1 +m  (N  m))2
m(N  m)C 0(e)
h0(e)f"l:n(0)
; (99)
which is negative if 1+N( 1) < 0, so the principal's payo decreases in the
degree of envy as long as  < N 1
N
and increases otherwise.47 If compassion is
relatively weak, the cost eect outweighs the incentive eect, but vice versa
when compassion is relatively strong.
Corollary 3: When the principal can design the tournament's prize struc-
ture, her prots are smaller with inequity averse FS-agents than with purely-
self-regarding agents. Her payo decreases in the strength of compassion and
decrease in the strength of envy if  < N 1
N
and increases otherwise.
3.3.3 The ERC-Model in Multi-Agent-Tournaments
Tournament Incentives: In tournaments with N > 2 participants, the
agents' most preferred share where inequality costs are zero moves from 1=2
to 1=N . Agent i's utility from receiving his prize wi in a tournament with N
participants is
ui = wi  W(&i); (100)
where wi is the agent's monetary payo and W(&i) his inequity costs. W
is the sum of all prizes w1 + ::: + wN or Nw2 +m w and &i the dierence
of received share i and the equal share 1=N , i.e., &i = i   1=N . (&i)
is a twice dierentiable function with  (0) = 0 and &i&i(&i) > 0. We still
assume that  (x) =  ( x), i.e., inequity costs are the same for advantageous
and disadvantageous deviations from the equal share. Therefore, if m = N
2
(m > N
2
, m < N
2
), then kW = kL (kW < kL, kW > kL), i.e., if the winner
prize is given to half (more than half, less than half) of the participants,
inequity costs are equal for losers and winners (lower for winners, lower for
losers). Intuitively speaking, ERC-agents \feel better" when they are part
of the majority group (ignoring monetary payos, of course). From &i =
47Note that  > N 1N also implies  >
N 1
N m , i.e., increasing the prize spread makes the
tournament less attractive to the agent.
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wi
Nw2+mw
  1
N
follows w(&i) > 0 and w2(&i) < 0, i.e., inequity costs increase
in the prize spread, but decrease in the loser prize.
For better readability, we denote W(&i) as k
W if agent i is a winner (i.e.,
wi = w1) and as k
L if agent i is a loser (i.e., wi = w2). Then, agent i's
expected utility is given by
EUi = G(h(ei))(w1   kW )
+ (1 G(h(ei))) (w2   kL)  C(e)
= w2   kL +G(h(ei))(w   kW + kL)  C(e);
(101)
which leads to the rst order condition 
w   kW + kL (h(ei); H i)h0(ei)  C(ei) = 0: (102)
When all other agents choose the equilibrium eort e, these two expressions
become
EUi = F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))(w1   kW )
+ (1  F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e)))) (w2   kL)  C(e)
= w2   kL + F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))(w   kW + kL)  C(e);
(103)
and 
w   kW + kL f"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))h0(ei)  C(ei) = 0: (104)
In equilibrium, ei = e
 and f"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))h0(ei) = f"l:n(0).
Proposition 8: In equilibrium, all agents with ERC-preferences choose
identical eort levels characterized by
(w   kW + kL)f"l:n(0) =
C 0(e)
h0(e)
: (105)
Compared to purely self-regarding agents, for any given prize spread agents
with ERC-preferences will exert ...
 ... the same eort if the winner prize is given to half of the participants.
 ... more eort if the winner prize is given to more than half of the
participants.
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 ... less eort if the winner prize is given to less than half of the partic-
ipants.
If m = N=2, kW = kL and both expressions cancel each other out. If
m > N
2
, it follows kW < kL, so there is an additional incentive eect to avoid
the loser's higher inequity costs which increases eort. If m < N
2
, it follows
kW > kL, so winning becomes relatively less attractive because it entails
higher inequity costs than losing.
Additionally, if the dierence of the inequity costs for winning and losing
exceeds the prize spread, i.e., if kW  kL + w, incentives are distorted to
such an extend that the agents actually prefer losing the tournament over
winning it. In this case, since eort is costly, agents would choose the mini-
mal possible eort level. Since inequity costs are convex, this becomes more
likely the higher the prize spread w (see also A.2.2).
Proposition 9: If the winner prize is given to less than half of the par-
ticipants in the tournament, incentives may be distorted to such a degree that
agents prefer to loose the tournament and do not exert any eort. This be-
come more likely the higher the prize spread and the stronger the degree of
inequality aversion and less likely the higher loser prize.
The Optimal Prize Structure: Agent i's participation constraint is
w2 +
m
N
w   C(e)  m
N
kW   N  m
N
kL  U0; (106)
which leads to the loser prize
w2 = U0   m
N
w + C(e) +
m
N
kW +
N  m
N
kL: (107)
The principal's maximization problem is then given by
max
e
Nh(e) NC(e) mkW   (N  m)kL  NU0; (108)
which yields the rst order condition
Nh0(e) NC 0(e) mkWe   (N  m)kLe = 0
,h0(e)  mk
W
e + (N  m)kLe
N| {z }
>0
= C 0(e) (109)
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Proposition 10: Compared to the rst best solution h0(e) = C 0(e), the
principal chooses to implement a lower eort level when agents are inequity
averse with ERC-preferences.
Since both the inequity costs of winners kW and the inequity costs of
losers kL increase in the prize spread w and the prize spread in turn strictly
increases in e, both inequity costs strictly increase in the inplemented eort
level, i.e., kWe > 0 and k
W
e > 0. Therefore, irrespective of how many winners
the tournament has, the implemented eort levels are lower than in the rst
best solution.
Corollary 4: When the principal can design the tournament's prize struc-
ture, her prots are smaller with inequity averse ERC-agents than with purely-
self-regarding agents.
3.3.4 Diminishing Sensitivity and FS-Preferences
We have seen that when agents have ERC-preferences and losers are in the
majority, if the prize spread becomes relatively large, incentives may be dis-
torted to such a degree that agents are not interested in winning the tour-
nament anymore. With FS-preferences on the other hand, we did not nd a
similar result. However, if we allow the marginal utility of the monetary pay-
o to be decreasing, scenarios may arise in which agents with FS-preferences
are not motivated to exert eort either.
To introduce diminishing marginal utility to the FS model, we adjust the
agents' utility function (87) in the following way
ui = vw(wi)  m
N   1v(w1   wi) 
N  m
N   1 v(wi   w2)  C(ei); (110)
where vw, v, and v are monotonously increasing concave functions with
vw(0) = v(0) = v(0) = 0. To comply with the original assumptions that
envy is stronger than compassion and that compassion is not stronger than
monetary utility for any given amount, we additionally assume v(x) > v(x)
and vw(x) > v(x) for all x > 0. The latter assumption assures that a player
would never reject an ultimatum game oer where he receives more than the
other player. Note that although we introduce concave inequity costs here,
this is not required for the distortion of incentives, which can also occur with
linear inequity costs.
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When all other agents choose e, agent i's expected utility is given by
EUi = F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))

vw(w1)  N  m
N   1 v(w1   w2)

+ (1  F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e)))

vw(w2)  m
N   1 v(w1   w2)

  C(ei)
= vw(w2)  m
N   1v(w) + F"l:n(h(ei)  h(e
))
vw(w1)  vw(w2) + m
N   1v(w) 
N  m
N   1 v(w)

  C(ei);
(111)
which yields the rst order condition
f"l:n(h(ei)  h(e))
vw(w1)  vw(w2) + m
N   1v(w) 
N  m
N   1 v(w)

=
C 0(ei)
h0(ei)
;
(112)
which means the equilibrium eort is characterized by
f"l:n(0)

vw(w1)  vw(w2) + m
N   1v(w) 
N  m
N   1 v(w)

=
C 0(eFS)
h0(eFS)
:
(113)
By way of comparison, purely self-regarding agents with diminishing sensi-
tivity of monetary utility but without inequity aversion would choose equi-
librium eort characterized by
f"l:n(0) (vw(w1)  vw(w2)) =
C 0(eS)
h0(eS)
: (114)
Compared to standard agents with linear monetary utility, for given prizes w1
and w2, agents with diminishing sensitivity would choose lower eort levels
because vw(w1)   vw(w2) < w (although the principal would implement
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the same rst best eort levels if she can choose the prizes). Comparing
agents with diminishing sensitivity with and without inequity aversion, the
inequity averse agents would exert less eort if their compassion is relatively
strong and the winner prize is given to less than half of the participants, i.e.,
v(w) >
m
N mv(w). Otherwise, inequity averse agents exert more eort.
This result mirrors the one without diminishing sensitivity.
If the winner prize is given to less than half of the participants, incentives
may be distorted to such a degree that agents prefer losing the tournament
over winning it. This is possible because if the loser prize is strictly positive,
the dierence in monetary utility of the two prizes is smaller than the mon-
etary utility of the prize spread as we have seen above. This, in turn, makes
it possible that the costs of compassion exceed the monetary utility gain of
receiving the winner prize, i.e., v(w) > vw(w1)   vw(w2) despite the as-
sumption v(x) < vw(x) for all x > 0. If additionally envy is relatively weak,
this can lead to the overall incentive eect of the prize structure becoming
negative, i.e.,
vw(w1)  vw(w2) + m
N   1v(w) 
N  m
N   1 v(w)

< 0;
in which case the agents prefer to loose the tournament and do not exert any
eort at all. This happens if
v(w) >
N   1
N  m(vw(w1)  vw(w2)) +
m
N  mv(w); (115)
i.e., if compassion is relatively strong, the loser prize relatively high and the
number of winners low (necessarily below N=2).
Consider the following illustrative example: A rm hires ten agents (N =
10), who receive a x wage of $975 (w2). After contracts are signed, the
principal posts a reward of additional $49 (w), which will be given to
the agent producing the highest output. Assuming vw = v =
p
x and
v(x) = 0:5
p
x, the agents utility from winning the tournament is
uwin =
p
w1   N  m
(N   1)0:5
p
w =
p
1024  9
18
p
49 = 32  3:5 = 28:5
while the utility from losing is
uloss =
p
w2   m
(N   1)
p
w =
p
975  1
9
p
49 = 31:22  0:78 = 30:44:
Since eort is costly, the agents choose zero eort to maximize their proba-
bility to not win the tournament.
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3.3.5 The Optimal Tournament Structure
Both the FS-model and the ERC-model generally agree that for a given prize
spread, eort of an inequity averse agent increases the more winners the tour-
nament has. Should the principal therefore always construct tournaments
with the maximum number of winners m = N   1?
Recall that in the model with standard agents, the number of winners is
irrelevant for the principal's payo. The principal's payo is
max
e
Nh(eFB) NU0  NC(eFB); (116)
with eFB characterized by h0(eFB) = C 0(eFB), which is independent of the
number of winners.
Next, let us consider the FS-model. In this model, the principal's payo
is
UP = Nh(e) NC(e) NU0
  m(N  m)
N   1 (+ )
C 0(e)
h0(e)
 
1 + m
N 1   N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)
:
(117)
Making use of the envelope theorem, the partial derivative of the principal's
payo with respect to m is the partial derivative of the fraction
 m(N  m)( + )
N   1
C 0(e)
h0(e)
 
1 + m
N 1   N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)
: (118)
The direct derivative of this expression is very inaccessible (see A.3.1), so
instead, we look at two parts of the expression separately. First, consider
the rst fraction m(N m)(+)
N 1 . This part of the expression represents the
inequity costs eect. When m agents receive the winner prize, there are m
agents suering compassion costs of (N m)w
N 1 and N   m agents suering
envy costs of mw
N 1 , so total inequity costs in the tournament are given by
m(N  m)(+ )w
N   1 : (119)
The partial derivative with respect to m is (N 2m)(+)
N 1 , so (119) has its
maximum at m = N=2 and decreases equally to both sides as m moves away
from N=2. Second, consider the fraction
C 0(e)
h0(e)
 
1 + m
N 1   N mN 1 

f"l:n(0)
: (120)
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The partial derivative with respect to m is
  (N   1)(  )C
0(e)
h0(e) (N   1 +m + (N  m))2 f"l:n(0)
< 0: (121)
This part represents the incentive eect, which increases in the number of
winners because  > . So overall, both fractions are decreasing in m for
m  N=2 and therefore the principal's payo (117) increases as the number
of winners increases beyond half of the participants. Therefore, when de-
signing tournaments with agents with FS-preferences, the principal should
give the winner prize to N   1 agents. Then, the principal has to pay the
agents the lowest compensation possible for their inequity costs and agents
exert the most eort (see proposition 6) for a given prize spread. Since under
unlimited liability, the principal can get back all additional money paid to
the winners by lowering the loser prize accordingly, N 1 winners it is clearly
the principal's preferred tournament structure.
Proposition 11: When the principal can design the tournament struc-
ture, she will choose the maximum number of winners if agents have FS-
preferences.
For agents with ERC-preferences, the results are less straightforward.
The principal's payo is
UP = Nh(e) NC(e) mkW   (N  m)kL  NU0
= Nh(e) NC(e) mW(&W )  (N  m)W(&L) NU0
(122)
The partial derivative with respect to m is
 W(&W ) +W(&L) mW&W (&W )&Wm   (N  m)W&L(&L)&Lm; (123)
but we can ignore W to simplify to
 (&W ) + (&L) m&W (&W )&Wm   (N  m)&L(&L)&Lm: (124)
Again, the expression consists of two parts. The rst one is  (&W )+(&L),
which represents the incentive eect. It is positive when there are more
winners than losers in the tournament (because  &L > &W for m > N=2).
The second part represents the inequity costs eect. The partial derivative
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of &i with respect to m is   wwi(Nw2+mw)2 < 0. Increasing &i increases the
inequality costs of winners, as their share moves further away from 1=N . On
the other hand, it decreases the inequality costs of the losers as they move
further toward 1=N . Therefore, we know
 m&W (&W )| {z }
>0
&Wm|{z}
<0
 (N  m)&L(&L)| {z }
<0
&Lm|{z}
<0
: (125)
The rst part is always positive, the second one always negative. Although
the expression is positive for m = N=2 because at this point  &L = &W
and &Wm < &
L
m generally, it does not necessarily stay positive. If m increases
further, &L moves further away from the equal share 1=N while &W moves
closer toward it, and if (&) is very steep, &L(&
L) may overpower all other
eects and make expression (124) negative. In that case, the principal's
payo would decrease if m increases. So depending on the steepness of the
inequity costs, the principal will either give the winner prize to N=2 of the
participants or to N   1 participants.
Let us also consider the exemplary ERC-utility function (50), which ad-
justs to the following expression in multi-agent-tournaments
Ui = wi  W b
2

wi
Nw2 +mw1
  1
N
2
= wi   (Nw2 +mw1) b
2

wi
Nw2 +mw1
  1
N
2
:
(126)
In a tournament with N participants and m winners, the total inequity costs
are
IC = m(Nw2 +mw)
b
2

w2 +w
Nw2 +mw
  1
N
2
+ (N  m)(Nw2 +mw) b
2

w2
Nw2 +mw
  1
N
2
:
(127)
The partial derivative with respect to m (see A.3.2) can be simplied to
bN2w2(w)
2   2bmNw2(w)2   bm2(w)3
2N3(w2)2 + 4mN2w2w + 2m2N(w)2
: (128)
For m = N=2, the numerator becomes
 bN
2
4
(w)3 < 0 (129)
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Therefore, inequity costs strictly decrease in the number of winners m in-
dependent of the degree of inequity aversion b. As a result, if agents have
ERC-preferences expressed by (126), the principal will always give the winner
prize to N   1 agents. Note, however, that this results does not necessarily
hold for a more general utility function
Ui = wi  W b
2

wi
Nw2 +mw1
  1
N
x
(130)
if x > 2.
Proposition 12: When the principal can design the tournament struc-
ture, she will choose the maximum number of winners if agents have ERC-
preferences with inequity costs that are not overly steep. Otherwise, she will
give the winner prize to half of the agents.
Remember that those results pertain only when the random variable is
uniformly distributed and f"l:n(0) is independent of m. It is easy to see
from (117) that the principal's payo in the FS-model increases as f"l:n(0)
increases. The same applies for the ERC-model, but it is very dicult to
show this without a concrete function for the inequity costs. However, the
same intuition applies for both models: From (92) and (122), it follows that
the necessary prize spread to induce a certain level of eort decreases in
f"l:n(0). A lower prize spread implies lower inequity costs, so the principal is
better o for each level of eort she wants to implement.
Recall that f"l:n(0) is the integral in (79), which consists of three parts.
Replacing l with N m and n with N 1, these three parts are N 1!
(N m 1)!(m 1)! ,
F (y)N m 1 [1  F (y)]m 1 and f(y)2. The latter expression is independent of
m and the other two are obviously both maximized if m = N
2
, so f"l:n(0) is
maximized if m = N
2
, too. Therefore, all other things equal, the principal
prefers to give the winner prize to N
2
agents if the random component is not
uniformly distributed.
Taken together, whether the aggregate eect is such that the principal
prefers to give the winner prize to the maximum number of agents or to half
the agents is impossible to say generally because of the complex expression
of f"l:n(0). However, it is clear that giving the winner prize to only one agent
is suboptimal.
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3.4 Discussion
Both the FS-model and the ERC-model agree that the principal is always
worse o with inequity averse agents compared to purely self-regarding ones.
However, this is no surprise because both models introduce costs to the
standard model which somebody has to pay. Since the agents never receive
any rent under unlimited liability anyway, it inevitably has to be the principal
who pays these costs.
The rst disagreement between both models arises in tournaments with
two agents. Under the FS-model, the prevalence of envy over compassion
creates an incentive eect as agents try to avoid the more costly emotion
of envy by winning the tournament. No such incentive eect occurs in the
ERC-model because it does not distinguish between advantageous and dis-
advantageous inequality.48
While it stands to reason that being ahead is preferable to being behind, it
is far from clear that the reason for this extends beyond the tangible benets.
For example, while everyone should prefer an allocation of 12 for oneself and
8 for the other (12j8) over 8 for oneself and 12 for the other (8j12), is it
necessarily true that people prefer 12j8 over 12j16 as the FS-model would
predict? Some studies have found evidence that disagrees with the FS-model
on this.49 If Fehr and Schmidt's assumption  >  turned out to be incorrect,
all models owing their main results to this assumption would immediately
become obsolete.
However, the point is not to question the validity of the FS-model's as-
sumptions, but to call for more robustness checks when the results of an
analysis depend on such a pivotal assumption. For example, in the tourna-
ment model, the incentive eect of inequity aversion vanishes if we dismiss
the assumption that envy is stronger than compassion. Yet, at the same
time, the incentive eect returns if we instead consider status seeking prefer-
ences, i.e.,  < 0.50 In fact, with status seeking agents, the principal would
be even better o than with purely self-regarding agents if the utility from
48To be precise, the original ERC-model does neither postulate nor preclude dierences
between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, as both instances are theoretically
compatible with the general ERC-value function.
49For example, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) do not nd much evidence for such prefer-
ences when examining dictator choices over three-person-allocations to compare the social
preference models of Fehr and Schmidt, Bolton and Ockenfels, and Charness and Rabin
(2002).
50The incentive eect can easily be deduced from (47).
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high status exceeds any disutility from low status (e.g. envy), i.e., if   > 
(see A.1.2).
Extending the analysis to more forms and functions of social preferences
does not only verify the universality of results, it also allows to examine
which type of agent is more likely to self-select into a particular incentive
mechanism, which type is preferred by the principal, and whether this cre-
ates a natural match or mismatch. For example, both compassionate and
envious types tend to dislike tournaments, while status seekers tend to like
them. Principals generally prefer status-seekers with low envy, so agents'
and principals' preferences are in accord with each other. Looking at real life
rms utilizing tournament incentive schemes, we should, therefore, expect to
nd people who enjoy being better o than others but who can cope well
when they are worse o.51 Strongly envious and particularly compassionate
types, however, should be rare in real-life tournaments.
Regarding multi-agent-tournaments, we nd that although the FS-model
and the ERC-model yield slightly dierent results in detail, they both gen-
erally agree that agents tend to prefer being in the majority group. Losing
the tournament is less bad when most of the other agents also lose and worse
when most of them win. From the principal's perspective, the best tourna-
ments have many winners, the worst have many losers. The two models paint
dierent worst case scenarios though. On the one hand, in the FS-model,
a small prize spread in association with a high loser prize (and diminishing
sensitivity) can distort incentives to such a degree that agents do not want
to win the tournament. On the other hand, the ERC-model predicts that
agents may lose interest in the tournament when the prize spread exceeds
a certain size. Although seemingly contradictory, both results may be con-
ceivable depending on the interpretation of compassion. For the rst case,
consider a department where the manager tenders a very small monetary
incentive to the best performer. The employees may care more about being
perceived as a \bootlicker" by their colleagues when winning than they care
about the small prize money. If the manager increases the award signicantly,
the employees' attitude will eventually change. For the second case, consider
a senior manager deciding whether to enter a promotion tournament for a
leadership position. If the position's salary is exorbitantly high, she may
consider it unethical and decline to participate in the tournament, choosing
51Alternatively, a status seeker could also be fairly envious, but have a low subjective
probability of losing, e.g. because of overcondence.
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instead to compete for a position with a more moderate salary increase.
If we take the result that many-winner-tournaments are better at face
value, we cannot help but wonder why tournaments with a majority of win-
ners are seemingly rare in reality? On the one hand, more often than not,
it may just be unfeasible to have that many winners. In promotion tourna-
ments, for example, there are simply not enough positions to ll. Alterna-
tively, principals may face restrictions in the design of the prize structure,
e.g. unlimited liability may not be possible. On the other hand, if tourna-
ments are interpreted as competition on a societal level - much like Lazear
and Rosen (1981) do in their article - we could argue that people actually
are engaged in a tournament with many winners where the winner prize is
not suering social decline (e.g. being red and becoming unemployed or
something worse). After all, it may not be completely outlandish to argue
that the presence of a large middle class in a society creates an incentive
eect for the general population to belong at least to that class.
Regarding the external validity of the theoretical results, it should be
noted that Orrison et al. (2004) experimentally analyze agents' eort deci-
sions in six-agent-tournaments over many rounds. Their results are essen-
tially contrary to the predictions of the inequity aversion models. They nd
that eort choices are lower with four winners than with two or three win-
ners.52 The authors conjecture that agents shirk more when prizes are given
to many participants because they anchor on the high winning probability
and do not thoroughly understand the dierence between marginal and total
winning probabilities. Their result suggests that there are other psycholog-
ical factors working contrary to the eects of inequity aversion which may
render many-winner-tournaments unsuitable in practice. However, it would
be interesting to see if the results of Orrison et al. extend to real eort tasks
and dierent distributions of the random variable.
3.5 Conclusion
In this essay, we apply the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt
as well as Bolton and Ockenfels to a simple tournament model. We nd
that irrespective of the model, inequity aversion generally reduces the prin-
cipal's payo when she can design the tournament's structure. With respect
to incentive eects for a given prize structure, both models yield dierent
52Similar results are obtained by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008).
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prediction. The increase in eort under the FS-model is not found under
the ERC-model for two-agent-tournaments. In tournaments with more than
two agents, both models largely agree that incentives are distorted toward
the majority group. Under certain circumstances, this eect can lead to the
elimination of all incentives to win the tournament.
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4 Does Altruism Depend on Rational Expec-
tations?
4.1 Introduction
Reference points are values or states of nature that act as benchmarks or
indicators for judgments, comparisons, and appraisals. As such, they con-
stitute a pivotal element of decision making. Their inuence extends to
various spheres of economic behavior, including { but not limited to { risk
attitudes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Koszegi and Rabin 2007), stock
trading (Odean 1998; Meng 2010), labor supply (Camerer et al. 1997; Fehr
and Camerer 2007; Crawford and Meng 2010), eort provision (Mas 2006;
Abeler et al. 2011), consumption behavior (Bell and Bucklin 1999; Koszegi
and Rabin 2009), brand choice (Hardie et al. 1993; Mazumdar et al. 2005), so-
cial judgments (Holyoak and Gordon 1983), negotiations (Kristensen 1997),
and job satisfaction (Ockenfels et al. 2010). While some aspects of reference
points are relatively well understood { for example, that negative deviations
usually loom larger than positive deviations (Tversky and Kahneman 1991)
or how reference points anchor judgments and decisions (Mussweiler and
Strack 1999; Epley and Gilovich 2006) { other issues are still unresolved.
In particular, the question which reference point is chosen when more than
one is available is still a much debated topic. Some models adopt the status
quo as the reference point (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Kahneman et
al. 1991; Masatlioglu and Ok 2005) whereas others endorse rational expecta-
tions (Loomes and Sugden 1986; Koszegi 2006). When the status quo is also
the best predictor of the future, both reference points naturally coincide, but
when they do not, which one do decision makers pick? Since it is very dicult
to reliably observe expectations in the eld, laboratory experiments provide
a good opportunity to gain insights into the importance of expectations for
the formation of reference points.
A couple of recent studies directly address this issue. Abeler et al. (2011)
manipulate expectations in a real-eort experiment. Their subjects work on
a tedious task and can quit whenever they desire. After they have nished
working, the subjects either receive a piece rate for each solved tasked or a
xed payment, each with 50% probability. By manipulating the size of the
xed payment, the authors vary the subjects' expectations about their pay-
ment and nd that more eort is provided when the xed payment is higher.
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Moreover, Ericson and Fuster (2010) endow subjects with an item which they
are allowed to trade with some probability. The lower this probability, the
more likely the subjects are to keep the item. Ericson and Fuster also elicit
willingness-to-pay prizes for items that the subjects may also receive for free
in a lottery. The higher the winning probability in the lottery, the higher a
subject's valuation of the item.
The idea for this particular study is based on psychological research on
outcome favorability and pro-social behavior. Some psychological studies
nd that subjects who have experienced success in a task are more willing to
work on behalf of someone else (Berkowitz and Connor 1966), to donate to
charity, and to help others (Isen 1970). These results have also been repli-
cated with children who donate more (Isen et al. 1973; Barnett and Bryan
1974) and share more with others (Bryant 1983) after being successful in
bowling. Pleasant surprises also have a similar eect. Subjects who have
found a dime in the coin return of a telephone booth or who have received
cookies while studying are more willing to mail a lost letter (Levin and Isen
1975) or help picking up dropped papers (Isen and Levin 1972). The in-
creased pro-social behavior is usually attributed to positive mood induced
by the favorable event (Isen 1999). However, from an economics perspective,
mood is a rather vague and intangible concept (although Hermalin and Isen
2007 have developed an intertemporal economic model of mood). Instead,
the pleasant events described above can also be understood as positive devi-
ations from a reference point and the evidence suggests that such deviations
increase pro-social behavior. Recently, Gneezy and List (2006) have used
pleasant surprise in a eld experiment with a gift-exchange setting by pay-
ing higher salaries than previously announced. Subjects receiving a higher
payment than expected show increased eort for a few hours, although the
net benet is negative compared to regularly paid subjects. Also related is
the study of Falk (2007), who attaches gifts to solicitation letters asking for
charity donations, nding that the likelihood of donations increases with the
value of the gift.
We test the hypothesis that expectation-based reference-dependent pref-
erences inuence pro-social behavior by letting subjects play a dictator game
in which the endowment is determined by a lottery. In our study, we com-
pare two groups of subjects who receive the same endowment, but have faced
dierent expected outcomes in the lottery, i.e., in one group subjects could
also have received a higher endowment, whereas in the other group, they
could have received a lower endowment. This way, we can test whether
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expectations aect the subsequent dictator transfer while controlling for in-
come eects. We get some weak conrmation of our hypothesis, but also
nd evidence for other reference points interfering with the eect we try to
identify.
4.2 Theoretical Predictions
The theoretical predictions regarding reference-dependent utility are based
on the model by Koszegi (2006), which to our knowledge is not only the
most widely used model of expectation-based reference points, but also easy
to comprehend mathematically. To model altruistic preferences, we fall back
to the CES-utility function of Andreoni and Miller (2002). This decision may
appear unusual in the face of the supply for more commonly used models of
social preferences. However, we require a framework that does not produce
corner solutions which rules out linear models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
or Charness and Rabin (2002). We could have utilized the ERC-model by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), but it seems improper to combine expectancy-
dependent utility with the relative payo expression of the model because
this would entail that depending on the reference point, an individual's most
preferred share lies above or below the equal share. That leaves us with the
CES-utility function of Andreoni and Miller (2002), which works well in our
context.
Koszegi (2006) assume that an individual's utility u(cjr) from an outcome
c is the sum of his classical outcome-based utility m(c) and gain-loss-utility
n(cjr) depending on the person's reference point r, i.e., u(cjr) = m(c) +
n(cjr). The reference point r is the person's recent probabilistic belief and
the gain-loss-utility is a function of the dierence between the outcome and
the reference point, i.e., n(cjr) = (m(c) m(r)). The function () satises
the properties of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) value function. Therefore,
the individual receives additional positive utility when the realized outcome
is higher than the reference point and suers from additional disutility when
it is lower.
Consider the two lotteries LL and LH , each with two equally likely out-
comes EL, EM and EM , EH , respectively. The three outcomes are ranked
EH > EM > EL. The reference points in both lotteries are the expected
values, i.e., rL = 0:5EL+0:5EM and rH = 0:5EM +0:5EH , respectively. The
middle outcome EM is higher than the reference point rL in lottery LL, but
lower than the reference point rH in lottery LH . Therefore, with reference
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dependent utility, receiving EM in lottery LL yields a higher utility than
receiving EM in lottery LH , i.e.
rL = 0:5EL + 0:5EM < 0:5EM + 0:5EH = rH
, n(EM jrL) > n(EM jrH)
, m(EM) + n(EM jrL) > m(EM) + n(EM jrH)
, u(EM jrL) > u(EM jrH):
In the dictator game, we assume that individuals receiving an endowment E
make their transfer decision x according to their utility function
ui = (a[E   x] + (1  a)x)
1
 ; (131)
which is the CES-utility function of Andreoni and Miller (2002), where a is
the degree of selshness with 0  a  1 and  the convexity of preferences,
yielding the elasticity of substitution  = 1=( 1). An individual maximizes
his utility by choosing the transfer x that satises
x = E
1
1 + A
with A =
 
a
1 a
 1
1  and A  1 if we assume a  0:5, i.e., if the own payo is
valued at least as high as the other person's payo.
If individuals get their endowment from a lottery, we can introduce reference-
dependent-utility from the realization of the endowment to the utility func-
tion, i.e., (131) changes to
ui = (a[E   x+ n(Ejr)] + (1  a)x)
1
 (132)
and the individual will make a transfer given by
x = [E + n(Ejr)] 1
1 + A
:
Therefore, if the endowment is determined by the lotteries LL and LH ,
we should expect individuals receiving EM from lottery LL to make higher
transfers than those receiving the same endowment from lottery LH .
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4.3 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted using the software
zTree (Fischbacher 2007) at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
at the University of Cologne, Germany. 264 subjects, who were recruited
via the Online Recruitment System ORSEE (Greiner 2004), participated in
twelve separate sessions. The average age was 24 years and 52.2% of the par-
ticipants were female. The subjects stayed at the lab for about 25 minutes
and earned e 6.73 on average, including a e 2.50 show-up fee and a e 0.50
bonus that was given to ensure that each participant received more than the
extra invitees who could not participate and were given the show-up fee, so
that receivers would not be too frustrated in case they were not given any
points by their senders. Once the experiment had started, the subjects were
divided into senders and receivers to play a standard dictator game where
the endowment was determined by a lottery. In the LOW -treatment, the
possible endowments were 100 points (L100 ) and 150 points (L150 ) and in
the HIGH -Treatment, they were 150 points (H150 ) and 200 points (H200 ).
One point equaled ve cents.
The main treatment comparison occurs betweens
Figure 2: The
Random
Mechanism
the subjects who receive 150 points in the LOW -treat-
ment (L150 ) and those who receive 150 points in the
HIGH -treatment (H150 ). The amount of 150 points
was chosen so that the equal split does not align with a
natural focal point like 100 or 50. Overall, we had 132
senders, 66 in each treatment. In the LOW -treatment,
35 subjects received 100 points and 31 received 150
points. In the HIGH -treatment, 33 senders received
150 and 200 points, respectively. The disparity in the
LOW -treatment is due to some variation in session size
and chance.
After the subjects were assigned randomly to an
isolated computer terminal, instructions diering for
the two roles (see B.1) were displayed on the com-
puter screen. Subjects were given as much time as they
needed to read the instructions and ask questions, al-
though less than a handful of subjects had any inquiries. The senders were
told that they would receive an endowment of points which they could allo-
cate between themselves and the receiver as they desired. However, the exact
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amount of points available would be determined by a random mechanism.
They were informed about the two possible amounts of points and that both
realizations were equally likely. After the senders indicated that they had
understood the instructions, a random mechanism (see Figure 2) determined
the realized endowment. After every sender had pressed a button, a small
ball fell down several levels to end up either in a light-gray or dark-gray
box, determining whether the endowment was high or low. The visual rep-
resentation was used for two reasons: First, to make the random draw more
transparent, and second, to create more suspense for the senders, which we
hoped might increase the psychological eect. The winning color alternated
between subjects and so did the order in which the two possible endowments
were presented. Thereby, we controlled for any eects the color might have
as well as for possible anchoring eects of the rst number shown. After the
lottery ended, senders declared how many points they wanted to transfer to
their receiver. On average, senders conrmed their transfer 34 seconds after
the conclusion of the lottery (median 30 seconds).
Meanwhile, the receivers were informed about their role and that the
senders would receive a randomly determined amount of points to allocate
between themselves and the receiver. They were not informed about either
the possible or the realized amounts and the senders knew that. To generate
some data from the receivers, they were also asked to make decisions in a
dictator game with random endowment, although they of course knew the
decisions were only hypothetical. However, contrary to the senders, receivers
answered for both possible endowments and did not encounter the visual ran-
dom mechanism. When the senders were in the LOW -treatment, receivers
were confronted with the two possible amounts of the HIGH -treatment and
vice versa, so we could truthfully tell the receivers that the situation they
faced was not the one of their assigned sender. After both receivers and
senders made their decisions, they answered a questionnaire before they re-
ceived their payment.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Main Results
The main variable of interest in the analysis is the \transfer ratio", i.e., the
ratio of a subject's transfer to his endowment, instead of the transfer itself.53
For a quick overview, Figure 3 shows the histograms of the senders' transfer
ratios for all four sub-treatments and Table 1 gives the basic statistics.54
Figure 3: Ratio of Transfer/Endowment for Senders
Comparing the transfer decisions in the two main sub-treatments L150
and H150, the data do not immediately show a clear support of the hypoth-
esis that transfers are higher in L150 than in H150. A one-sided Mann-
Whitney-U-Test (MWU) only gives a p-value of 0.23 (z = 0.737), which
53For example, if a subject in L100 transfers 25 points, the transfer ratio is 0.25 or
25% (25/100) and if a subject transfers 30 points in L150, the transfer ratio is 0.20 or
20% (30/150). This should make it easier to compare results across sub-treatments with
dierent endowments.
54Note that in the sub-treatment L100, one subject gave 80% of the endowment, which
is not represented in the histogram in order to retain the same dimensions across all four
graphs. Table 1 contains one entry with and one without this subject. It appears that
this subject simply made a mistake because in the questionnaire, the subject stated that
\instead of the fair 50 points I gave only 20 points".
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slightly points into the right direction, but is not statistically signicant.
Other non-parametric tests like the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test or a Two-
Sample Randomization-Test do not indicate any treatment dierences ei-
ther. However, consistent with the hypothesis, subjects are more likely to
keep the whole endowment in H150 (16 of 33, 48.5%) than in L150 (9 of 31,
29%). This result is weakly signicant on a one-sided Fisher's Exact Test
(FE, p=0.09). A one-sided logit-regression conrms that subjects are more
likely to choose a positive transfer in L150 than in H150 (p=0.055) and this
treatment dierence remains weakly signicant in all estimated alternative
models (see Table 14).
Figure 4: Categorization of Senders
From the histograms, it appears that the presumed treatment eect mostly
aects low contributors. Dividing subjects into the three categories ego-
ist (transfer = 0), weak altruist (0 < transfer  25%), and strong altruists
(transfer > 25%), we get the distributions presented in Figure 4 and Table
2. A 2-test weakly conrms that the types dier in frequencies between
L150 and H150 (p=0.062, 2 = 5:58). A one-sided MWU-Test using only
egoists and weak altruists shows highly signicant dierences between L150
93
and H150 (p=0.006, z=-2.50).55 Overall, while there is some support for the
presumed treatment eect in the data, the hypothesis that there are no dif-
ference between the treatments cannot be rejected with as much condence
as we would typically like.
Mean StD Median N
All .169 .184 .100 132
L100 .197 .215 .100 35
(.179) (.190) (.100) (34)
L150 .154 160 .067 31
H150 .151 .197 .013 33
H200 .174 .159 .200 33
Egoists Altruists
Weak Strong
All 51 44 37
L100 14 9 12
L150 9 14 8
H150 16 6 11
H200 12 15 6
Table 1: Transfer Ratios of Senders
Table 2: Categorization of
Senders
4.4.2 The Warm Glow of Giving? { Mood
In the questionnaire, senders are asked to recall their mood before the draw of
the random mechanism, after the draw of the random mechanism, and after
their transfer decision, and rate it on a scale from 0 (terrible) to 10 (excellent).
The average mood among senders before the lottery is very similar across
all four sub-treatments, with no signicant dierences. The success in the
lottery has the expected eect on mood (see Figure 5 and also Figure 7 in
the appendix). To compare mood before and after the lottery, we use a
Wilcoxon Matched-Pair Signed-Rank Tests (MPSR) which yields p-values
below 0.001 in all four sub-treatments, i.e., mood increases signicantly if
the subject wins the lottery and decreases signicantly if the subject loses.
However, the subjects' average mood also changes signicantly again in the
opposite direction after they have made their transfers. The mood decreases
for subjects who have won the lottery (MPSR p = 0.003, z=3.01 for L150,
p = 0.043, z = 2.02 for H200 ) and increases for subjects who have lost the
lottery (MPSR p = 0.019, z=-2.34 for L100, p = 0.003, z = 3.01 for H200 ;
see Figure 8 in the appendix). This eect is conrmed by a highly signicant
55Although this (rather conveniently) ignores that H150 has a small advantage in strong
altruists, 11 to 8.
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Figure 5: Mood of Senders
negative correlation between the mood change after the lottery and the mood
change after the transfer (Spearman's  = -0.53, p < 0.0001), i.e., when the
mood increases after the lottery, it tends to decrease after the transfer and
vice versa (Figure 9). Taken together, the overall eect does not completely
balance out (Figure 10). Subjects in L100 are still in signicantly worse mood
at the end of the experiment than at the start (MPSR p < 0.001, z=3.43),
whereas those in H200 are in signicantly better mood (MPSR p = 0.013,
z=-2.49). For the two main sub-treatments, the subjects in L150 experience
a slight increase in mood on average while those in H150 experience a slight
decrease. The dierence between both sub-treatments is weakly signicant
(MWU p=0.081, z=-1.75).
Contrary to our expectations, there is virtually no direct relationship
between the subjects' mood and their transfer behavior. All correlations
between absolute mood or mood change and the transfer-ratio are generally
very small and insignicant (see Table 4 in the appendix). Other tests like
OLS-regressions do not show any signicant eect of mood or mood change
on transfers either. There are not even any dierences between egoists, weak
altruists, and strong altruists as mood improvement and mood deterioration
are essentially identically distributed among the three types (Table 5). For
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example, the average transfer ratio of subjects whose mood improves after
the transfer is 18.9% and the average transfer ratio of subjects whose mood
worsens is 18.3%. To sum up, we nd no evidence that positive mood induces
higher transfers (or the other way around).
4.4.3 Fairness
The surprising result of the mood analysis is that mood \changes direction"
after the transfer, yet there appears to be no relationship between mood and
transfer behavior at all. One explanation could be that the initial mood
change caused by the lottery is simply very short lived and vanishes on its
own within the approx. 30 seconds it takes the senders to make their transfer
decision. However, in other studies, similar eects last from 20 minutes (Isen
et al. 1976) up to several hours (Gneezy and List 2006). Another possible
explanation is that the subjects in the sub-treatments perceive their \moral
obligation" dierently and that their change in mood after the transfer re-
ects that. We can test the latter explanation because subjects are asked
what they consider a \fair" transfer for their own situation. Over all sub-
treatments, the average fair ratio of transfer/endowment is 36:6% with a
mode and median answer of 50% (65 subjects). Two other ratios are chosen
more than ten times, 33:3% (14) and 0% (13), respectively. 56
The average stated fair ratio is 39:2% (median 50%) when subjects win
(L150 and H200 ) and 32:8% (median 40%) when subjects lose (L100 and
H150 ). The dierence is weakly signicant (two-sided MWU p=0.062, z=-
1.86). When we only consider the two main sub-treatments L150 and H150,
the fair ratio in L150 has the higher mean and median (39.2% to 32.8%;
50% to 40%), but the dierence is not signicant (two-sided MWU p = 0.13,
z=-1.52). There is some empirical evidence that positive mood increases
fairness concerns (Carnevale and Isen 1986) and indeed, there is a positive
and signicant correlation between a subject's mood change after the lottery
and the stated fair ratio ( = 0.19, p=0.03), i.e., improved mood leads to a
higher fairness standard.
Can the relationship of fair ratio to actual transfer ratio help explain the
mood change after the transfer? First, note that the stated fair ratio is a
relative good predictor of a subject's actual transfer (Table 6). It is highly
56Two subjects gave answers above 50%, 52:6% (79 of 150) and 100% (150 of 150). Both
answers are ignored for the remaining analysis because they are probably mistakes of some
sort.
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signicantly correlated with the actual transfer ratio (Spearman's  = 0.36,
p < 0.001), although if broken down for each sub-treatment, the relationship
seems to be stronger for the two loss conditions (Table 7). Indeed, only 25%
of subjects in L150 and H200 transfer the amount they consider fair, whereas
36.8% of the subjects in L100 and H150 do (FE p=0.13). Winners deviate
more from their own fairness standard (-22.7%57) than losers (-16.3%), a
signicant dierence (MWU p=0.045, z=-2.01).
In sum, subjects who win the lottery have a higher fairness standard, but
also deviate more from this standard, apparently \paying" with some of their
improved mood from the success in the lottery to be less fair. On the other
hand, subjects who lose the lottery remain closer to their fairness standard,
which makes them feel good about themselves, compensating for their mood
loss after the lottery. This explanation is consistent with the fact that the
treatment eect is mostly found for lower transfer ratios. Both eects may
more or less balance out for strong altruists, but cannot balance out for weak
altruists because their fairness standard drops too close to zero.58 However,
there is a huge variance in the data on the individual level, so we must be very
careful with drawing nal conclusions. At least, we can establish that the
relationship between mood and pro-social behavior is not as straightforward
as it appears in other studies.
4.4.4 Aspirations
Besides the status quo and expectations, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also
suggest the possibility that aspirations can act as reference points. Therefore,
we also ask senders if they came to the lab with a certain monetary goal in
mind. 59 senders answered in the armative, with the average monetary
goal being e 7.92 (median 7.5, mode 5 and 10). 53 of the 59 subjects have
monetary goals matching or exceeding their maximum possible income, i.e.,
the sum of their endowment plus show-up fee and bonus. Therefore, they
need to keep the whole endowment to come as close as possible to their target.
However, monetary goals appear to have little to no inuence on the actual
transfers. Although the average and median transfer ratio of subjects with a
57The dierence between fair ratio and actual ratio is in absolute terms, i.e., if the fair
ratio is 50% and the actual transfer ratio is 40%, the dierence is 10%.
58Note that of nine of the twelve \fair egoists", i.e., subjects who consider no transfer
to be fair, lose in the lottery.
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monetary goal are slightly lower than those of other subjects (mean: 0.159 to
0.178; median: 0.1 to 0.2) and their share of egoists is higher (26 of 73, 25 of
59), too, no test (MWU: p = 0.424, z=0.8; MT: p=0.698, Pearson 2 = 0.15;
FE: p=0.475) shows any signicant dierences. Transfer ratios of senders
with high ( e 7.50) and low (< e 7.50) goals do not dier signicantly
either (mean: 0.153 to 0.165; median: 0.06 to 0.1; MWU p=0.756, z=0.32;
MT p = 0.87, Pearson 2 = 0.03; FE p=0.605; see Table 9).
Nevertheless, some subjects state in the questionnaire that their goal did
in fact inuence their decision as these selected quotes show:
 \Since I saw that I would not reach the 10 Euro, I took as much as I
could."
 \[...] once I knew it was possible to reach [the 6 Euro], my goal was to
allocate accordingly."
 \Because of my goal, I kept all points for myself."
 \It inuenced my decision so that I gave the receiver only 25% of the
endowment to reach my income goal."
The great majority of the 59 subjects, however, stated that their aspiration
level did not inuence their decision (with some adding that they would
have kept the whole endowment anyway). Taken together, while it seems
that some people are inuenced by it, in general, the aspiration level has no
noticeable eect on the aggregated results.
4.4.5 Beliefs
Another possible reference point is the belief about what other subjects in
the same situation do. In the questionnaire, senders state their belief about
the mean contribution of other subjects with the same endowment. Although
we do not incentivize accuracy of beliefs, they are remarkably close to the
actual contributions. On average, senders believe that other senders give
17.9% of the endowment, which is less than 1% higher than the actual average
transfer ratio of 17%. Dierences between the four sub-treatments are small
and insignicant (Table 8). We do not nd any correlation with mood or
mood change (all p-values  0:285 or higher) and there is also no eect of
the lottery's result on beliefs in general (MWU p = 0.56, z = -0.58) or in the
two main sub-treatments L150 and H150 (MWU p = 0.393, z=-0.85).
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A sender's beliefs about the contribution of others is { by far { the best
predictor for his own transfer. The Spearman correlation coecient is  =
0.636 (p < 0.001) and a simple regression explaining the transfer ratio with
the ratio of belief/endowment (belief ratio) gives an R2 of 0.4. However,
only 48 of the 132 senders (36.4%) acknowledge that they were actually
thinking about what the other participants might do when they made their
transfers. Although these 48 senders have a stronger correlation between
belief and transfer ( = 0:75; p < 0:001), the correlation for the other 84
senders remains quite high ( = 0:57; p < 0:001) and the aggregated beliefs
do not dier signicantly between both groups (means: 17%, 18.4%; MWU
p = 0.81, z = -0.24).
It appears that the belief is a very strong reference point, both consciously
and unconsciously. The unconscious eect may be channeled through the
fairness perception as beliefs and fairness standards are highly correlated
( = 0.42, p < 0.001). However, since we did not incentivize accuracy of
beliefs, senders might use their beliefs as a pretext to justify their own (low)
transfers.
4.4.6 Receivers
Receivers are asked to make the same transfer decision as senders, only hy-
pothetically and for both endowments at the same time, i.e., either 100 and
150 or 150 and 200.59 An overview of the answers is given in Figure 6 and
Table 3. Not surprisingly, the average hypothetical transfer ratio of 27.9% is
higher than the average real transfer ratio of 17%.
However, more interesting, the receivers show a clear distinction between
the good and the bad outcome. Of the 61 receivers making their decision in
the LOW -Treatment, 48 choose a higher ratio (not amount!) in L150 while
only 13 choose the same ratio in both cases. Of the 64 receivers deciding in the
HIGH -Treatment, 46 choose a higher ratio in H200 and 18 choose the same
ratio. Nobody has a higher ratio when losing the lottery, meaning, among
other things, that nobody choose the same transfer for both outcomes. Both
the within treatment dierences (L100 to L150 and H150 to H200 ) and the
between treatment dierences (L150 to H150 ) are highly signicant (MPSR
59In the following analysis, we ignore seven subjects who made hypothetical transfers
higher than 50% in any entry. We assume these receivers either misread the instructions
and entered the amount they would have kept or purposefully gave a nonsensical answer
out of frustration over being in the passive role.
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Figure 6: Ratio of Hypothetical Transfer/Endowment for Receivers
Mean StD Median N
All .267 .168 .267 250
L100 .217 .123 .267 61
L150 .321 .178 .333 61
H150 .245 .154 .288 64
H200 .334 .200 .448 64
Table 3: Ratio of Hypothetical Transfer/Endowment for Receivers
100
p < 0.001; one-sided MWU p=0.003, z=2.73). These results clearly support
the main hypothesis { with the reservation that these are non-incentivized
decisions.
In the questionnaire, the receivers also state their idea of a fair transfer
for both endowments. The fair ratio is nearly identical for all four situations
(Table 10) as 93 of the 129 subjects who gave sensible answers chose 50% in
both cases. There was no signicant eect of the lottery's result on fairness
standards. This is remarkable because althought the fairness standard hardly
changes between sub-treatments, (hypothetical) transfers change a lot. As a
sidenote, comparing the receivers' mean fair ratio of 46.7% to the senders'
36.6%, there appears to be some self-serving bias in the fairness assessment
(the dierence is highly signicant for all sub-treatments with the exception
of H200 ).60
Receivers are also asked about their beliefs about how much senders would
transfer for each of the two possible endowments.61 On average, the receivers
believe that senders would transfer 25.3% of the endowment, which is a higher
than the actual transfers (Table 11). The dierences between sub-treatments
are weaker compared to the hypothetical transfer, although the result remains
weakly signicant for L150 and H150 (one-sided MWU p = 0.051, z=1.64),
i.e., receivers expect higher transfers in L150 than in H150. Similar to the
senders, the belief has a higher correlation ( = 0.64) to the hypothetical
transfer than the fairness standard ( = 0.40), though both correlations are
highly signicant (p < 0.001).
4.4.7 Economics Students
Of all 132 senders, 60 are economics students. Their average transfer ratio
over all four sub-treatments is 11:5%, compared to 21:5% for other partic-
ipants (Tables 12 and 13). This dierence is highly signicant (two-sided
MWU p=0.001, z = 3.25). The economics students are much more homoge-
neous, i.e., the variances of their transfers is signicantly lower as a random-
ization test for dierences in variance (Kaiser and Lacy 2009) conrms (0.035
to 0.027; p=0.05). In the two main sub-treatments L150 and H150, there
are 16 and 15 economics students, respectively, transferring on average 14:3%
and 4:5% of the endowment. This dierence is weakly statistically signi-
cant (one-sided MWU p=0.057, z=-1.577), supporting the main hypothesis.
60It is also noteworthy that nobody stated a fair standard of 0%.
61Again, we ignore ten receivers that gave answers above 50%.
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Economics students also dier slightly in their overall assessment of a fair
ratio from other participants (mean 32:6% to mean 38:8%, MWU p=0.09,
z=1.69), but show similar correlation of fair transfer to actual transfer ( =
0.37, p = 0.004 to  = 0.38, p<0.001). However, they have signicantly lower
beliefs about the other senders' transfers, 13.8% to 21.3% (MWU p=0.003,
z=2.91), which may explain the dierent transfer behavior. Additionally, it
is noteworthy that the beliefs of a group reect that group's behavior rea-
sonably well, i.e., the beliefs of economics and other students are relatively
closer to their actual respective transfers.62 However, there are no signicant
dierences between these groups with regard to mood or mood changes.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Interpretation of the Results
The data do not oblige to a straightforward conrmation of the theoretical
prediction, but tell a more complex story. To recapitulate, we expected that
subjects with an endowment of 150 points transfer more when their expected
endowment was lower (L150 ) compared to when their expected endowment
was higher (H150 ). However, the dierences in transfers between the two
main sub-treatments are only indicative for the most part. For example, the
likelihood of a sender transferring a positive amount is weakly signicantly
stronger in L150. However, the hypothesis receives stronger support from
data collected from the receivers. Hypothetical transfer behavior is very much
in line with the theoretical predictions as the majority of receivers chooses
higher transfer ratios after winning the lottery. Assuming the receiver data
is in fact representative for actual behavior, it appears that the use of the
strategy method helps to remove the noise which seems to plague the senders'
data.
The analysis of the questionnaire data identies the importance of other
reference points beside expectations. Fairness perception and beliefs about
other people's behavior show a strong correlation with own transfer, whereas
aspiration levels generally appear to have very little to no inuence. Both
fairness and beliefs are \soft" reference points, i.e., they are not based on
an observable objective value, and may therefore themselves be expectancy-
dependent. However, while there is weak evidence that fairness standards
62Dakkak et al. (2007) nd a similar eect in an intercultural trust game where beliefs
about the outgroup reected behavior of the ingroup.
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are higher after winning the lottery, beliefs do not signicantly depend on
the outcome of the lottery. It appears therefore that fairness standards are
inuenced to some degree by expectations, whereas beliefs are not, even
though there is a very strong correlation between fairness standards and
beliefs. In general, the strong correlation of beliefs with actual transfers and
the very low sensibility of beliefs to expectations seem to some degree to
overshadow the eect of expectations on transfers.
The analysis of the senders' mood does not conrm the assumption that
good mood leads to more pro-social behavior or vice versa. The only way
mood might play a role in the transfer decision is by presuming some kind of
mental accounting where subjects \spend" some of their good mood to make
transfers lower than what they consider fair. However, the individual data
are too noisy to credibly validate such claims.
4.5.2 Possible Improvements
In hindsight, the experiment probably could have beneted from a few dif-
ferent design choices. One particular decision that appears to have backred
is to not employ the strategy method (Selten 1967) for the senders' decision.
Originally, we were afraid that making the decision for two situations would
prompt the subjects to choose the same transfer ratio both times. Addi-
tionally, we worried that the treatment eect would become less prominent
when the subjects were \cold", i.e., when they did not actually experience
the result of the lottery. Judging by the decision patterns of the receivers,
those concerns were clearly unwarranted. On the other hand, the application
of the strategy method may have opened the door for the supposition that
the results were at least partially aected by some kind of demand eect.
Another aspect we would have liked to change was the composition of the
subject pool. As it were, we had to invite a much more heterogeneous group
than initially planned. In particular, we would have liked to invite subjects
with similar, preferably little or no experimental experience.63 However, we
had to realize quickly that we would not get the necessary number of partic-
ipants this way. The fact that the treatment eect is much more prominent
among economics students than among other participants seems to indicate
that a more homogeneous subject pool would have created less noise (pos-
sibly because beliefs are more homogeneous), which would have allowed the
63A quote from a sender's questionnaire: \I decided to give nothing because from my
experience, decisions are nearly always selsh in this kind of experiment."
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treatment eect to become more evident.
Furthermore, we will consider incentivizing the subjects' beliefs elicitation
in a follow-up experiment, even though Gachter et al. (2006) nd that while
incentives increase the accuracy of beliefs slightly, in public goods games,
they do not change the overall distribution of contributions and beliefs. Nev-
ertheless, since the results using beliefs are so strong, it would be good to
substantiate their validity with incentive compatibility. However, we origi-
nally decided against incentives for two reasons. First, we did not want to
prolong the experiment any further. Second, with incentivized belief elicita-
tion, the subjects would have had another source of potential income, which
might have distorted their behavior in the dictator game. A possible solu-
tion to this dilemma would be to have two groups, one with and one without
incentives for accurate beliefs.
Apart from the reliability of their elicitation, beliefs (or rather their vari-
ance) also pose a problem for the identication of the treatment eect. The
fact that beliefs are apparently unaected by expectations, yet are highly cor-
related with actual transfer behavior and are also fairly unevenly distributed
between 0% and 50% appears to severely conceal the eect we are most in-
terested in. By harmonizing subjects' beliefs over others' behavior, we might
be able to expose the eect of expectations more clearly. For example, we
could simply tell subjects what others have done in similar experiments or
mask the clue more subtly, e.g. in a seemingly unrelated quiz. However, we
would need to be careful not to create strong focal points or demand eects,
which could counteract the treatment eect again. However, it would be
preferable to demonstrate any treatment eect without resorting to manipu-
lating the subjects' beliefs. A more homogeneous subject pool, for example,
may already give us suciently uniform beliefs to accomplish that.
There is one more thing to consider for a possible follow-up experiment.
By announcing beforehand that the senders will make transfers to the re-
ceivers, it is possible that senders not only judge their realized endowment
with respect to their expectations, but that they also form expectations about
their transfers. We could circumvent this by announcing the dictator game
after the realization of the lottery, which should be ethically unproblematic
because the senders have not made any decision at this point. However,
the drawback is that the instructions for the dictator game would increase
the delay between the realization of the lottery and the transfer decision,
which may weaken the desired treatment eect. Such considerations would
of course become obsolete with the implementation of the strategy method,
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which seems to be the most promising plan at the moment.
4.6 Conclusion
Our experiment provides some support for the theory of expectancy-dependent-
preferences. It appears that for a given monetary payo, individuals are more
likely to act pro-socially after a positive deviation from their expectation than
after a negative deviation. However, the evidence is not hard enough to draw
denite conclusions with authority. At least, we are able to identify several
points in the original design of the experiment which can be improved in a
follow-up study in order to obtain more convincing data.
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A Appendix: A Closer Look at Inequity Aver-
sion and Incentives in Tournaments
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof I: ERC in DG and UG
Given an endowment of Y = 1, maximizing the utility function
Ui(iY; i) = aiY   b
2

i   1
2
2
(133)
yields the rst order condition
a  b(i   1
2
) = 0: (134)
Therefore, in the dictator game, the player keeps the ratio of the endowment
given by
i =
1
2
+ a=b: (135)
Hence, the player only makes a positive transfer if 2a < b.
In the ultimatum game, the player rejects an oer if the utility from the
oer is less than when both players get a payo of zero, i.e.
ai   b
2

i   1
2
2
< 0
,ai   b
2

2i   i +
1
4

< 0
, b
2
2i  

a+
b
2

i >   b
8
,2i  

1 +
2a
b

i >  1
4
,2i  

1 +
2a
b

i +

1
2
+
a
b
2
>  1
4
+

0:5 +
a
b
2
,

i   1
2
  a
b
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>
ab+ a2
b2
,i   1
2
  a
b
<  
p
ab+ a2
b
,i < 1
2
 
p
ab+ a2   a
b
(136)
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A.1.2 Proof II: Status Seeking
We dene a status seeker as an agent i who receives a positive utility of (wi 
wj) when his prize exceeds the prize of the other agent. The mathematical
analysis of envious and status seeking agents ( > 0,  < 0) is obviously
very closely related to the analysis of the FS-model, so we immediately skip
to the rst result. Envious and status seeking agents will choose eort level
characterized by
w(1   + )g(0) = C
0(e)
h0(e)
(137)
and will therefore always exert more eort than purely self-regarding agents
and than envious and compassionate agents. When the principal makes
the participation constraint binding, the envious and status seeking agent
receives a loser prize of
w2 = U0   1
2
(1     )w + C(ei): (138)
If the positive status utility of winning exceeds the utility loss of envy
when losing, i.e.,   > , agents accept lower loser prizes than purely self-
regarding agents. Inserting this loser price into the principal's payo function
leads to the following maximization problem
max
e
2h(e)  2C(e)  ( + )w   2U0 (139)
Expression the prize spread w as a function of e yields the rst order
condition
h0(e)  ( + )
2(1 +   )g(0)
C 00(e)h0()  C 0(e)h00(e)
(h0(e))2
= C 0(e): (140)
If   > , implemented eort levels are above the rst best level and since
agents also accept lower loser prizes, the principal is better o than with
purely self-regarding agents. If   < , implemented eort levels are below
the rst best levels and agents have to be paid higher loser prizes, so the
principal remains worse o than with standard agents. However, for any
given degree of envy, she is still better o with status seeking agents than
with compassionate ones. The partial derivatives with respect to  and 
are given by
  1  2
(1 +   )2C
0(e)h0(e)g(0) < 0
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and
  1 + 2
(1 +   )2C
0(e)h0(e)g(0) < 0;
respectively. So the principal's payo strictly decreases in the degree on envy
and strictly increases in the degree of the status seeking (decreasing ).
A.2 Examples
A.2.1 Approach to a Solution for the Optimal Prize Structure
with ERC-Agents and Numerical Example
A possible approach to a solution is, for example, the Lagrange multiplier.
Maximizing the principal's payo (63) under the constraint (59) yields the
Lagrange-function
(w;w2; ) = 2h(e(w))  2C(e(w))  2k(w2;w)  2U0
+ 

w2   U0 + 1
2
w   C(e(w))  k(w2;w)

(141)
and the three necessary conditions
@ 
@ w
= 2h0(e(w))e0(w)  2C 0(e(w))e0(w)  2kw(w2;w)+


1
2
  C 0(e(w))e0(w)  kw(w2;w)

= 0;
(142)
@ 
@ w2
=  kw2(w2;w) +  [1  kw2(w2;w)] = 0 (143)
and
@ 
@ 
= w2   U0 + 1
2
w   C(e(w))  k(w2;w) = 0: (144)
Solving (143) for  and inserting the expression into (142) yields
2h0(e(w))e0(w)  2C 0(e(w))e0(w)  2kw(w2;w)
+
kw2(w2;w)
1  kw2(w2;w)

1
2
  C 0(e(w))e0(w)  kw(w2;w)

= 0;
(145)
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This expression would have to be solved for either w or w2 and inserted
into (144), but this is not possible in the current general form because (145)
contains neither w nor w2 directly. However, for more intuitive insight into
the mechanism, please consider the following numerical example.
Assume h(e) = e, C(e) = e
2
8
, U0 = 0 and g(0) =
1
2
. Agents have pref-
erences expressed by the ERC-utility function (50) with b = 0 for purely
self-regarding agents and b = 2 for inequity averse agents. The incentive
constraint (57) becomes
1
2
w =
e
4
;
so both types of agents choose e = 2 w in equilibrium. With purely
self-regarding agents, the loser prize is given by (62) and the principal's
maximization problem (63) becomes
maxw 2h(e
)  2U0 +w   2C(e) w =
maxw 4 w   (w)2:
This yields the rst order condition
w = 2:
To meet the agents' participation constraint, the principal has to pay a loser
prize of
w2 = U0   1
2
w + C(e) = 0  1 + 2 = 1:
To sum up, in the standard model, the principal sets the prize spread w to
2 and the loser prize w2 to 1. Agents choose rst best eort levels of e
FB = 4
and earn U0 = 0 in expectation. The total surplus UP is 4.
With inequity averse agents, the participation constraint with given by
w2 +
1
2
w   C(e)  k(w;w2) = U0
,w2 + 1
2
w   w
4
  (w)
2
2(2w2 +w)
= 0;
which leads to the principal's maximization
maxw 2h(e
)  2U0 +w   2C(e)  2k(w;w2) w =
maxw 4 w   (w)2   (w)
2
2(2w2 +w)
:
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The solution to this problem is non-trivial because the inequity costs depend
both on the prize spread w and the loser prize w2. Therefore, we construct
the Lagrange-function
(w;w2; ) =4 w   (w)2   (w)
2
2(2w2 +w)
  

 w2   w
2
+
(w)2
2
+
(w)2
4(2w2 +w)
 (146)
and get the three necessary conditions
@ 
@ w
=4  2 w   (w)(4w2 +w)
2(2w2 +w)2
  

 1
2
+ w +
(w)(4w2 +w)
4(2w2 +w)2

= 0;
@ 
@ w2
=
(w)2
(2w2 +w)2
+ 

1 +
(w)2
2(2w2 +w)2

= 0
and
@ 
@ 
= w2 +
w
2
  (w)
2
2
  (w)
2
4(2w2 +w)
= 0;
Solving the second equation for  yields
 =   2(w)
2
(w)2 + 2(2w2 +w)2
:
Inserting this expression into the rst equation gives us
4  2 w   (w)(4w2 +w)
2(2w2 +w)2
+
2(w)2
(w)2 + 2(2w2 +w)2

 1
2
+ 2w +
(w)(4w2 +w)
4(2w2 +w)2

= 0:
Solving for w2 yields
w2 =
w
p
16 w   31  4(w)2   7 w
8 w   16
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and inserting this expression into the third necessary condition yields
w
p
16 w   31  4(w)2   7 w
8 w   16 +
w
2
  (w)
2
2
  (w)
2(w   2)
w
p
16 w   31  15 w = 0;
(147)
which can only be solved numerically. Doing so yields an optimal prize
spread of w  1:98 and in turn a loser prize of w2  1:19 (and   0:19).
Therefore, the agents will choose an eort level of e  3:96. This prize
structure results in a total surplus of UP  3:55 for the principal.
A.2.2 Numerical Example that ERC-Agents Do Not Exert Eort
Assuming agents have the following utility function
ui = wi   b
2
W (
wi
W
  1
N
)2: (148)
Then agents prefer losing the tournament if
ui(w2) > ui(w1)
,w2   b
2
(Nw2 +mDeltaw)(
w2
Nw2 +mw
  1
N
)2 >
w1   b
2
(Nw2 +mDeltaw)(
w1
Nw2 +mw
  1
N
)2
,  bm
2(w)2
2N3w2 + 2mN2w
> w   bN
2(w)2   2bNm(w)2 + bm2(w)2
2N3w2 + 2mN2w
,bN
2(w)2   2bNm(w)2
2N3w2 + 2mN2w
> w
,b > 2N(Nw2 +mw)
w(N   2m) :
The partial derivative of the right hand side with respect to w2, w, N ,
and m are given by
2N2
w(N   2m) > 0;
  2N
2w2
(w)2(N   2m) < 0;
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2w2N
2   8mw2N   4m2w
N2w   4mNw + 4m2w;
and
N2(4w2 +w)
N2w   4mNw + 4wm2 ;
so the necessary degree of inequity aversion to prefer losing the tournament
increases in the loser prize and decreases in the prize spread. For the number
of participants and winners, no general results can be derived.
A.3 Derivatives
A.3.1 Derivative of (118)
( + )(m2( + ) + 2m(N(1  )  1) N(N(1  )  1))
(N   1 +m  (N  m))2
C 0(e)
h0(e)f"l:n(0)
:
(149)
A.3.2 Derivative of (127)
b(Nw2 +mw)

w2+w
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
2
+
bmw

w2+w
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
2
 
b(Nw2 +mw)

w2
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
2
+
b(N  m)w

w2
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
2
 
bmw(w2 +w)

w2+w
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
Nw2 +mw
 
b(N  m)w2w

w2
Nw2+mw
  1
N
2
Nw2 +mw
;
(150)
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B Appendix: Does Altruism Depend on Ra-
tional Expectations?
B.1 Instructions
B.1.1 General Information
You are now participating in a scientic economic experiment. In this ex-
periment, you can earn money. Your income depends on your decision and
on the decisions of other participants. Independent of the results of the ex-
periment, each participant will receive the show-up fee of 2.50 Euro and an
experiment-specic bonus of 0.50 Euro.64 Therefore, each participant will
receive at least 3.00 Euros today. All payos from the experiment are added
to this amount. At the end of the experiment, the total amount you have
earned will be paid out in cash.
These instructions are private information for you. Please cease all com-
munication with other participants from this point on. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your cabin and help you.
Please note that because of the electronic devices, eating and drinking in the
cabin is not allowed. A violation of these rules can lead to the disqualication
from the experiment and all payments.
We also ask you to turn o all cellphones, MP3-players, etc. and to
go without other distractions like books, newspapers or other documents.
Thank you kindly!
During the experiment, all your income will be calculated in points, not
in Euros. At the end of the experiment, all your points will be converted into
Euros. 1 point equals 5 Cents.
Please also note the following points: All decisions are made anonymously,
i.e., no other participant is informed about another participant's decision.
The payment at the end of the experiment is also anonymous, i.e., no other
participant is informed about the payment of another participant.
The following page explains the exact procedure of today's experiment.
64We did a pilot where we had an exceptionally high share of senders who transfered
no points (over 50%). To keep frustration levels low we added the 50 cents to ensure that
each participant would receives more money when participating than when he or she could
not particpate (because we needed even numbers).
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B.1.2 Senders Only
The participants of today's experiment have been randomly assigned to dif-
ferent groups. All members of your group will receive an identical amount
of points. You can allocate these points as you desire between yourself and
another participant (receiver). Each member of your group has been as-
signed exactly one (dierent) receiver. The exact amount of points that you
and the other members of your group can allocate has not been determined
yet. The amount will either be LOW-Treatment: 100 points or 150 points /
HIGH-Treatment: 150 points or 200 points.
A random mechanism will determine which one of the two amounts you
will have available. Both amounts are equally likely, i.e., both have a prob-
ability of 50%. After chance has determined the exact amount of points,
you decide how many points you want to allocate to the receiver. You keep
all remaining points for yourself. The receiver is informed that somebody
decides about the allocation of points between him/herself and the receiver.
The receiver has no information about how many points are potentially or
actually available. The receiver will not receive other points except those
that you allocate to him/her.
The experiment ends after you made your allocation decision. There are
no further rounds. At the conclusion of the experiment, every participant is
paid out his or her points at the same exchange rate (1 point = 5 cents) in
addition to the 3 Euro that every participant receives for participating.
B.1.3 Receivers Only
The participants of today's experiment have been randomly assigned to dif-
ferent groups. You belong to the group of receivers. Each receiver has been
assigned exactly one member of another group. The participant that has
been assigned to you will receive a randomly determined amount of points.
The participant can allocate these points freely between him- or herself and
you. As a receiver, you do not have the possibility to inuence your payo.
However, we would like to ask you a few questions about how you would have
acted if you had been in a dierent position.
The experiment ends after all allocation decisions have been made. There
are no further rounds. At the conclusion of the experiment, every participant
is paid out his or her points at the same exchange rate (1 point = 5 cents)
in addition to the 3 Euro that every participant receives for participating.
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B.2 Additional Graphics
Figure 7: Mood Change After Lottery
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Figure 8: Mood Change After Transfer
Figure 9: Mood Change Correlation
(with Noise Added for Superimposed Values)
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Figure 10: Total Mood Change
Figure 11: Categorization of Receivers's Hypothetical Transfer
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B.3 Additional Tables
Mood L100 L150 H150 H200 All
Before lottery 0.11 (.511) 0.23 (.214) -0.18 (.314) 0.11 (.561) 0.06 (.523)
After lottery 0.25 (.141) 0.23 (.208) 0.13 (.468) -0.27 (.136) 0.06 (.486)
After transfer 0.06 (.746) 0.08 (.661) 0.03 (.873) 0.04 (.808) 0.03 (.754)
Mood Change L100 L150 H150 H200 All
After Lottery 0.03 (.851) -0.15 (.408) 0.18 (.307) -0.48 (.005) -0.03 (.729)
After Transfer -0.22 (.208) -0.04 (.847) 0.02 (.898) 0.18 (.317) -0.02 (.789)
Overall -0.14 (.428) -0.13 (.472) 0.20 (.277) -0.15 (.394) -0.00 (.961)
Table 4: Spearman's Rho and P-Values for Correlations Between Senders'
Mood and the Ratio of Transfer/Endowment
After Lottery Mood Up Mood Down No Change
Egoists 21 19 11
Weak Altruists 14 22 8
Strong Altruists 15 10 12
Economics 30 20 10
Non-Economics 28 23 21
After Transfer Mood Up Mood Down No Change
Egoists 19 14 18
Weak Altruists 11 14 19
Strong Altruists 13 15 9
Economics 20 19 21
Non-Economics 25 22 25
Table 5: Change of Senders' Mood After the Conclusion of the Lottery and
After the Transfer Decision
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All L100 L150 H150 H200
Const 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.28) (0.03) (0.28) (-0.15) (0.63)
Fair Ratio 0.43*** 0.53*** 0.38** 0.47*** 0.29
(5.33 ) (2.94) (2.22) (3.28) (1.51)
F 28.46 8.63 4.94 10.76 2.28
Prob > F 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.14
R2 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.07
Table 6: OLS-Regression: Transfer Ratio Explained by Fair Ratio (Senders)
 p
All 0.389 0.000
L100 0.412 0.014
L150 0.289 0.114
H150 0.442 0.013
H200 0.062 0.733
Table 7: Correlation of Fair Transfer and Actual Transfer (Senders)
Mean StD Median
All .179 .141 16.7%
L100 .180 .146 20.0%
L150 .184 .125 20.0%
H150 .164 .148 13.3%
H200 .189 .147 25.0%
Table 8: Sender's Beliefs About Other Senders' Transfer Ratio
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N Mean StD
Goal > e 7.50 28 .153 .187
Goal <= e 7.50 31 .165 .165
Payo goal 59 .159 .190
No payo goal 73 .178 .180
Table 9: Ratio Transfer/Endowment for Subjects with Payo Goal
Mean StD Median N
All .463 .081 .500 258
L100 .463 .086 .500 63
L150 .465 .081 .500 63
H150 .457 .083 .500 66
H200 .467 .076 .500 66
Table 10: Fair Transfer/Endowment by Receivers
Mean StD Median N
All .253 .170 .250 244
L100 .263 .159 .300 63
L150 .275 .153 .333 63
H150 .229 .176 .200 59
H200 .243 .176 .250 59
Table 11: Belief about Senders' Transfer/Endowment by Receivers
Mean StD Median N
All .115 .165 .003 60
L100 .133 .055 .000 12
L150 .143 .175 .067 15
H150 .045 .088 .000 16
H200 .146 .021 .200 17
Table 12: Transfer/Endowment by Economics Students (Senders)
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Mean StD Median N
All .215 .188 .217 72
L100 .230 .200 .200 23
L150 .165 .149 .133 16
H150 .251 .220 .333 17
H200 .205 .172 .250 16
Table 13: Transfer/Endowment by Non-Economics Students (Senders)
Logit1 Logit2 Logit3 Logit4 Logit5 Logit6 Logit7
Const -0.06 0.08 0.69 -0.59 -0.35 0.86 1.28**
(-0.17) (0.18) (0.68) (-1.32) (-0.84) (1.49) (2.36)
Wona -0.83* -0.83* -0.88** -0.89* -0.85* -0.74* -0.78*
(-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.66) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.34) (-1.31)
Female -0.26
(-0.50)
Initial Moodb -0.11
(-0.79)
Econ. Student 1.09**
(2.00)
Monetary Goal 0.68
(1.28)
Fair Ratio -2.94**
(-2.05)
Belief Ratio -8.81***
(-3.32)
Log likelihood -41.53 -41.41 -40.96 -39.44 -40.70 -39.21 -34.08
LR chi2(2) 2.57 2.82 3.71 6.76 4.23 7.22 17.48
Prob > chi2 0.11 0.24 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.00
a) one-sided, b) all other mood variables are insignicant, too
Table 14: Logit-Regressions for L150 and H150
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